This article appears in the July 25, 2003 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
Europe's Energy Supply:
On the Way to California
by Lothar Komp
Italy
is in an energy emergency. For the first time since the end of the
Second World War, the Italian energy system stood on the verge of
collapse at the end of June. In order to avert the worst, the manager
of the national energy grid was forced to impose targetted blackouts on
several sections of Rome and other parts of Italy. There was no time
for advance warnings. Thus, on June 26, thousands of Italians were
suddenly in the dark; on the roads, chaos broke out on account of the
disconnected traffic lights, and throughout Rome, people were locked in
traffic jams, and had to be freed with help of the Fire Department.
Altogether, 6 million Italians were temporarily cut off from electric
power. Alberto Clo, managing director of the energy firm ENI,
commented: "That the sixth-most powerful economy in the world cannot
supply itself with sufficient energy, is absurd and pitiable."
Since
the partial privatization of Italy's electricity sector (see article
following), assured supply to the population is no longer the highest
priority for the stockmarket shares of the competing power generators.
Now each puts the blame on the other; besides, they say, "The national
emergency was recognized for a long time."
Problem Is Europe-Wide
No
one should think that Italy, even for now, is an isolated case.
Everywhere in the European Union—from nation to nation—the energy
sectors have, for several years, been hit with a whirlwind of
confusion, as a consequence of managed deregulation at varying
tempos. National suppliers were privatized; monopolies were broken up;
and the electricity markets opened up even to foreign producers. All
this, according to the theory, promoted competition and promised
households, as it did businesses, low energy prices.
In
practice, it then appears to have turned out otherwise, unfortunately.
First of all, suddenly, a cross-border takeover battle has broken out
in the European energy markets, just like in the telecom sector.
Companies encumber themselves with debts, or go to the stock enchange
in order to absorb smaller rivals. At the same time, the companies
occasionally offer a ruinous price war, so that in the first two or
three years after the beginning of deregulation in one area, the price
of electricity actually declines. Thus the maxim holds: Whoever
invests, loses. Capital expenditures in the safety and delivery
capacity of electrical systems are reduced to a minimum; there are no
capital expeditures on new units after the one time when they are built.
Very
quickly, then, a small group of market-dominating big companies have
become more and more ubiquitous, and those low prices are now a thing
of the past.
Altogether,
by this means, the precious reserve capacities for peak consumption
periods have been driven down in the afflicted economic systems; and in
some nations, even in normal times, the energy supply has been made
dependent on buying considerable additional supplies from foreign
countries. Finally, all that is needed now is an unusually cold Winter,
or an unusually hot June or July, and catastrophe strikes.
Energy Crisis in the Land of Milk and Honey
The
Scandinavian example: Norway is in a virtual paradise, with a wealth of
energy production permitted. That nation is, after Saudi Arabia, the
second-largest oil and gas exporter in the world. Moreover, there is an
enormous potential in hydropower, so that today, 99% of Norway's own
electricity requirement is generated from water. In addition to this,
Norway exports electricity from hydropower on a large scale to
neighboring Scandinavian countries. Norway ranks near Switzerland and a
few sheikhdoms, among the nations with the highest per-capita income in
the world.
Yet,
in the past Winter, elderly Norwegians died in freezing cold in their
homes, because they were terrified of high electric bills! The
immediate cause was a particularly warm and dry Summer in 2002,
followed by a dry Autumn, so that the water level of the reservoirs
fell. The Winter was especially cold, and even the water supply in the
reservoirs of the hydroelectric power plants froze. An energy emergency
has erupted throughout Scandinavia. The prices in the northern energy
Exchange North Pool tripled within a few days. In Sweden, energy prices
rose 260% compared to the previous year. In Norway itself, the price of
electricity exploded in February 2003 to 87 öre [[per kilowatt-hour?]],
while during the typical year 2002, it was around 20 öre. In some
districts in the middle of Norway, the local authorities even
terminated energy distribution. Since the reservoirs are for the near
future almost empty, emergency gas power plants must now be built from
the ground up, on an urgent basis.
In Norway in particular, the energy crisis provoked displeasure at the market-determined energy supply. The conservative Aftenposten
itself demanded a reversal of energy policy, and characterized the
extreme deviations "politically explosive." Thousands of Norwegians
demonstrated in front of Parliament for government intervention; for
instance, by setting maximum prices or granting government subsidies
for heating repairs to low-income families. The Homeowners Association,
which organized the demonstration, warned of "Russian conditions" in
Norwegian energy supplies.
At
the beginning of the 1990s, Norway and Sweden jointly deregulated their
energy sectors. Since then, electricity supply and demand alone have
regulated the price. That is also to say, however, that the energy
providers only make money, if the electricity each company and each
private household requires to survive, is kept in short
supply—"California style." Thus, the Norwegian energy companies were
blamed, when, in the Summer and Fall of 2002, as the calamity in the
coming Winter was already in sight, they continued to direct
undiminished exports to Sweden—so that the water levels of Norway's
reservoirs were deliberately allowed to fall to record lows.
In
Sweden, electricity prices were hiked up in the Winter not only because
of the dependence on imports from Norway. In some parts of Sweden,
including Stockholm's Kista suburb—the Swedish "Silicon Valley"—there
were, in addition, power shortages due to defective maintenance of the
electric grid. Here, re-regulation and investments in new energy
generating facilities are being considered now, along with the division
between sense and nonsense about nuclear power. The cancellation of the
nuclear power plant Barsebäck 2 has been deferred for the second time.
The opposition demands that the Swedish law that prohibits the
construction of new nuclear plants be rescinded. Finland recently
declared that it wanted to build a fifth nuclear reactor.
When Will the Lights Go Out in Britain?
The
deregulation of the energy sector in Great Britain—measured in
electricity prices—was extremely successful, in striking contrast to
the previously mentioned examples of the Italians and Scandinavians.
The only problem is: It was so successful, that the largest British
power producer, British Energy, has been put into bankruptcy by it, and
in Autumn 2002, only a last-minute rescue package by the government
saved it from going under.
British
Energy, which was privatized in 1996, manages 15 nuclear plants, of
which eight are in Great Britain. A quarter of all British private
households get their power from British Energy. In the course of the
early deregulation, numerous foreign firms, not the least of which were
[[Eon and RWE]] from Germany, had bought themselves into the British
electricity market. In the meantime, the wholesale prices for power had
fallen by more than a third, and quite obviously below the cost of
production. At the beginning of September 2002, British Energy
announced that it had indebted itself so much, by problems at home and
for its companies abroad, that without an immediate government rescue,
it would have to file bankruptcy. The stock price of British Energy
collapsed 65% within one day. The bonded debt was downgraded to "junk."
The market value of the firm crashed to one-ninth of the value
immediately after privatization. In the end, the government offered a
financial injection in the sum of 650 million Euros for the short-term
survival of the company.
Only
a few weeks later, TXU Europe ran out of money. The company operated
three coal power plants in Great Britain and provided four million
customers with power. Here, too, the government was called on for help.
In the middle of October 2002, a liquidity crisis escalated in the
power company UK Coal, so that the management, in a kind of panic
reaction, suddenly halted all coal deliveries to the biggest British
power plant, AES Drax in North Yorkshire.
On
July 1, 2003, the British Institution of Civil Engineers published an
alarming study, in which it said that projecting present trends, by
2020 at the latest the lights could literally go out in Great Britain.
The study reported that coal and nuclear shutdowns will make 80% of the
of the energy supply of Great Britain depend on gas pipelines from
politically "unstable" regions of the world: "If future gas supplies
were interrupted, this country would have major difficulty in keeping
the lights on ... What would happen then? Under current plans, with no
gas, this country would have no electricity."
German Electric Price in Updraft
Energy
market "liberalization" began in Germany in April 1998. In that
country, somewhat differently than in Great Britain, state regulating
authority is supposed to be renounced, and all matters are supposed to
be decided through self-regulation and free agreement among
associations. Here also, at first, the electricity price clearly went
down, at least for industrial users. The immediate result was a
dramatic clearing-out of the workforce. Altogether, within a few years,
about 40,000 jobs—that is, one-quarter of the workforce of the
electricity production and distribution sector—were wiped out.
Meanwhile, the concentration process advanced so rapidly through
countless takeovers and mergers, that the electricity price rose again,
across a broad front, in the Summer of 2000. Among private households,
taxes for the support of renewable energy resources and other extra
energy taxes and fees had already long since eaten up the price
decreases. For this year, the Electric Power Association expects an
increase in average electricity costs of about 6% for Germany's private
households.
Much
worse, is the fact that in Germany, as in almost all other European
nations, the energy infrastructure is becoming obsolete, because the
investment-hostile phase of deregulation followed upon more than a
decade of already-existing drops in investment in production sites and
distribution networks. Thus, the yearly investment level of electricity
providers in the country, since the middle of the 1980s, was halved
from a barely sufficient 8 billion euros, to 4 billion euros now. Only
in the first three years after reunification of East and West Germany
in 1990, did the level of electricity industry investment manage a
brief pickup.
For
the coming years, according to energy firms' existing plans, a further
drop in annual investment to 3 billion euros is foreseeable.
Up
to the beginning of the next decade, one coal- and gas-fired power
plant after another will have to be replaced by new capacity. Starting
in 2005, on top of this, the politically motivated removal from the
electricity grid of 19 nuclear energy units—which presently provide
one-third of Germany's supply—is supposed to take place. To maintain
the German electricity supply under these circumstances, gigantic
investments by the energy firms—for the most part already highly
indebted—will be necessary. An explosion of electricity prices were the
likely result then.
However,
the reliability of the energy supply is already in danger in Germany
now. It appears paradoxical, but, with every new electric fan that is
turned on in Germany, the danger of uncontrolled power cutoffs, like
those in Italy and Russia, increases.
Electricity
is no ordinary commodity. Once produced, it can be stored only in very
limited quantities. On the other hand, the exact amount of electricity
must continuously be fed into the electric grid to match the exact
amount required by users, so that the grid frequency always remains
around 50 Hz. Otherwise, if fluctuations in frequency occur, anything
can happen—from local interruptions of power, to blackouts in large
sectors. However, since the wattage of an electric fan, as everybody
knows, fluctuates between 0% and 100% output, and, in practice, cannot
be known, for every megawatt in an installed electric fan, one must at
the same time hold an additional megawatt of electrical generating
capacity in reserve. Thus, the electric fans themselves are already a
subsidized business, and must be subsidized on an ongoing basis by
taxpayers and electricity consumers.
Reregulate, Return to Reality
The
North German Refinery (Norddeutsche Affinerie, NA), Europe's greatest
copper producer, wants to redeploy half of its total 3100 workforce
into a service business, because the company would otherwise have to
pay out 4.5 million euros—almost a quarter of its annual profit—for
special eco-electric fees. Only if one spins off the labor-intensive
part of a German company, does it fall under the hard-case provision of
the Renewable Energy Law (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes-EEG). NA Chief
Werner Marnette said: "If this ideologically-driven nonsense does not
cease, soon the raw materials industry in Germany will no longer have a
chance."
It
is high time to rethink the politics of energy in Europe. Decades-long
neglect of investments in infrastructure; the ecological-ideological
aberrations of the '70s and '80s; and, finally, the deregulation
experiments of past years, have undermined the reliability of the
European electricity supply to an unparalleled extent. Reregulation is
necessary, to stop extreme fluctuations in the price of electricity,
and make the reliability of the electricity supply again the top
priority. After that, massive investments in new energy plants are
needed, in which the emphasis must be placed on the most advanced
technologies, including nuclear energy. At the same time, the European
nations must quadruple their efforts to develop the energy production
of the future—nuclear fusion power.
By
carrying on with current policies, Europe will soon be subject to
California conditions on a daily basis, with catastrophic consequences
for workplaces and income.
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