'..Over 70% of the population believe that society cannot function without state support, and only 9% believe that citizens should take care of themselves, show initiative. Even though people do see the defects of the system, 53% of them believe that personal interventions from the most senior state officials are the most effective method of crisis management .. People do not thus seem to notice the fact that the government itself has worsened Russia’s economic situation (for instance, by bringing the country into international isolation as a result of the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions). Nor do they seem to notice the many feigned anti-crisis measures taken by the government becoming separate sources of crisis phenomena, while the main beneficiaries of the budget support is the narrow elite circle and not the Russian public.. (35)
..
..the West is increasingly prepared to accept the distinctness of the Russian political system and is focusing on limiting the negative effects of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. (33)
..
..At present, the most realistic scenario for Russia is long-term stagnation – without an economic collapse but also with no chance for real growth. Russia will most likely continue to develop at a much slower rate than the rest of the world for many years, and its backwardness as compared to the developed countries will become more pronounced.' (39)
'The lack of respect for basic rights (including property rights) and the excessive development of the supervision apparatus and the repression apparatus are an effect of the
absolute dominance of the executive power and secret services in the institutional system of the state. According to government estimates, the operation of the supervision system leads to business losses that reach 5% of GDP annually. Small and medium-sized business, which have no links to political decision-makers, are the main victim of suppressing competition and the lawlessness of the increasingly strong secret services.
Furthermore, all levels and areas of the Russian state’s operation – from big contracts as part of public procurement to education, healthcare and citizen’s everyday contacts with public servants –
are permeated by the omnipresent systemic corruption which is an effect of the historic legacy and the fact that a great volume of ‘easy money’ was until recently in circulation. The estimated losses to the state budget and business circles inflicted by corruption reach hundreds of billions of dollars annually (estimates have been made, for example, by Transparency International). Russia has for years been far below the top one hundred countries covered by the survey in Transparency International’s corruption perception rankings. (15, 16)
..
The government is clearly lacking the political will to change the governance model and to support those who want reforms with real competences. One proof of this is the fact that none of the development strategies developed so far has been implemented to a significant degree. This is caused by financial motives
(the elite is not ready to share its future income with the public), the political background, and the psychology of power. The durable connection of power and ownership in Russia, the mutual distrust inside the elite and the awareness that their political influence will be at stake should the costly and socially painful reforms be implemented, effectively thwart any attempts to actually put them into effect. The key institutions that would have to be reformed are the foundation of the present government system which guarantees incomes and security to the elite.
Thus the ‘reform paradox’ is that the logic of the government’s response to the crisis is strongly conditioned by the logic of the existing ineffective and anti-reform oriented model focused on maintaining stability and control of socio-political life. (20)
..
Along with the temporary moves intended at neutralising selected manifestations of the crisis by way of adequately applied propaganda, the government has also taken long-term action aimed above all at maintaining high public support levels for Vladimir Putin ahead of the presidential election. These actions are based on simulating the creation of a state development strategy, the manifestation of which is the discussion on the desired direction of reforms seen among the government elite. It is intended at concealing the lack of a real anti-crisis strategy, above all to delude the public, including liberal circles, and also foreign investors.
In this context the simultaneous activation of several advisory and decision-making centres is symptomatic. According to the government’s declarations, these are expected to work on reforms. Not only various ideas to overcome the crisis have been put forward so far, but also assurances of the desire to combat corruption, improve the business climate, and improve the competitiveness of the Russian economy can be regularly heard in such debates. These are nothing but propaganda slogans, if one takes into account the real sources of Russia’s economic problems. (25, 26)
..
Kudrin’s proposals appear to be the most well-thought-out and consistent of the solutions presented so far, but they will be impossible to implement for political reasons because they would undermine the foundations of the existing model where the state is governed by a small group forming the elite. Furthermore, there is a tacit consensus among the participants of the reform debate that the proposals of strictly political reforms (free elections and respect for civil liberties and rights) remain a taboo. In this context, Putin’s reaction to Kudrin’s proposal of reducing tension in the policy towards the West for the sake of economic development was symptomatic. The president, justifying the present anti-Western policy, employed such categories as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘Russia’s thousand-year-old history’. This leaves no doubt about the real priorities of the government as regards governing the country. (29)
..
..the West is increasingly prepared to accept the distinctness of the Russian political system and is focusing on limiting the negative effects of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. (33)
..
..The supremacy of the law enforcement agencies in the system, which perform preventive and repressive functions in dealing with real and potential opponents of the Kremlin, along with the lack of an alternative leader and an alternative system that would guarantee that the elite would maintain their power and property, means that the elite still binds their careers to the centralised, paternalistic Putin model. (34)
..
..Over 70% of the population believe that society cannot function without state support, and only 9% believe that citizens should take care of themselves, show initiative. Even though people do see the defects of the system, 53% of them believe that personal interventions from the most senior state officials are the most effective method of crisis management .. People do not thus seem to notice the fact that the government itself has worsened Russia’s economic situation (for instance, by bringing the country into international isolation as a result of the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions). Nor do they seem to notice the many feigned anti-crisis measures taken by the government becoming separate sources of crisis phenomena, while the main beneficiaries of the budget support is the narrow elite circle and not the Russian public.. (35)
..
..
At present, the most realistic scenario for Russia is long-term stagnation – without an economic collapse but also with no chance for real growth.
Russia will most likely continue to develop at a much slower rate than the rest of the world for many years, and its backwardness as compared to the developed countries will become more pronounced. (39)
- Maria Domanska,
Crisis in Russia. The degradation of the model of economic governance, March 2017
Context'The Kremlin’s confrontational stance towards the West is not a temporary matter..' - Maria Domanska