John Gittinger was interested in all facets of personality,
but because he worked for the CIA, he emphasized deviant forms. He particularly
sought out Wechslers of people who had rejected the values of their society
or who had some vice-hidden or otherwise-that caused others to reject them.
By studying the scores of the defectors who had come over to the West,
Gittinger hoped to identify common characteristics of men who had become
traitors to their governments. If there were identifiable traits, Agency
operators could look for them in prospective spies. Harris Isbell, who
ran the MKULTRA drug-testing program at the Lexington, Kentucky detention
hospital, sent in the scores of heroin addicts. Gittinger wanted to know
what to look for in people susceptible to drugs. The Human Ecology project
at Ionia State Hospital in Michigan furnished Wechslers of sexual psychopaths.
These scores showed that people with uncontrollable urges have different
personality patterns than so-called normals. Gittinger himself journeyed
to the West Coast to test homosexuals, lesbians, and the prostitutes he
interviewed under George White's auspices in the San Francisco safehouse.
With each group, he separated out the telltale signs that might be a future
indicator of their sexual preference in others. Gittinger understood that
simply by looking at the Wechsler scores of someone newly tested, he could
pick out patterns that corresponded to behavior of people in the data base.
The Gittinger system worked best when the TSS staff
had a subject's Wechsler scores to analyze, but Agency officials could
not very well ask a Russian diplomat or any other foreign target to sit
down and take the tests. During World War II, OSS chief William Donovan
had faced a similar problem in trying to find out about Adolf Hitler's
personality, and Donovan had commissioned psychoanalyst Walter Langer to
make a long-distance psychiatric profile of the German leader. Langer had
sifted through all the available data on the Führer, and that was
exactly what Gittinger's TSS assessments staff did when they lacked direct
contact (and when they had it, too). They pored over all the intelligence
gathered by operators, agents, bugs, and taps and looked at samples of
a man's handwriting.[3] The CIA
men took the process of "indirect assessment" one step further than Langer
had, however. They observed the target's behavior and looked for revealing
patterns that corresponded with traits already recorded among the subjects
of the 29,000 Wechsler samples.
Along this line, Gittinger and his staff had a good
idea how various personality types acted after consuming a few drinks.
Thus, they reasoned, if they watched a guest at a cocktail party and he
started to behave in a recognizable way-by withdrawing, for instance-they
could make an educated guess about his personality type-in this case, that
he was an I. In contrast, the drunken Russian diplomat who became louder
and began pinching every woman who passed by probably was an E. Instead
of using the test scores to predict how a person would behave, the assessments
staff was, in effect, looking at behavior and working backward to predict
how the person would have scored if he had taken the test. The Gittinger
staff developed a whole checklist of 30 to 40 patterns that the skilled
observer could look for. Each of these traits reflected one of the Wechsler
subtests, and it corresponded to some insight picked up from the 29,000
scores in the data base.
Was the target sloppy or neat? Did he relate to
women stiffly or easily? How did he hold a cigarette and put it into his
mouth? When he went through a receiving line, did he immediately repeat
the name of each person introduced to him? Taken as a whole, all these
observations allowed Gittinger to make a reasoned estimate about a subject's
personality, with emphasis on his vulnerabilities. As Gittinger describes
the system, "If you could get a sample of several kinds of situations,
you could begin to get some pretty good information." Nevertheless, Gittinger
had his doubts about indirect assessment. "I never thought we were good
at this," he says.
The TSS assessment staff, along with the Agency's
medical office use the PAS indirectly to keep up the OSS tradition of making
psychological portraits of world leaders like Hitler. Combining analytical
techniques with gossipy intelligence, the assessors tried to give high-level
U.S. officials a better idea of what moved the principal international
political figures.[4] One such
study of an American citizen spilled over into the legally forbidden domestic
area when in 1971 the medical office prepared a profile of Daniel Ellsberg
at the request of the White House. To get raw data for the Agency assessors,
John Ehrlichman authorized a break-in at Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office
in California. John Gittinger vehemently denies that his staff played any
role in preparing this profile, which the White House plumbers intended
to use as a kind of psychological road map to compromise Ellsberg-just
as CIA operators regularly worked from such assessments to exploit the
weaknesses of foreigners.
Whether used directly or indirectly, the PAS gave
Agency case officers a tool to get a better reading of the people with
whom they dealt. CIA field stations overseas routinely sent all their findings
on a target, along with indirect assessment checklists, back to Washington,
so headquarters personnel could decide whether or not to try recruitment.
The TSS assessment staff contributed to this process by attempting to predict
what ploys would work best on the man in the case officers' sights. "Our
job was to recommend what strategy to try," says a onetime Gittinger colleague.
This source states he had direct knowledge of cases where TSS recommendations
led to sexual entrapment operations, both hetero- and homosexual. "We had
women ready-called them a stable," he says, and they found willing men
when they had to.
One CIA psychologist stresses that the PAS only
provided "clues" on how to compromise people. "If somebody's assessment
came in like the sexual psychopaths', it would raise red flags," he notes.
But TSS staff assessors could only conclude that the target had a potentially
serious sex problem. They could by no means guarantee that the target's
defenses could be broken. Nevertheless, the PAS helped dictate the best
weapons for the attack. "I've heard John [Gittinger] say there's always
something that someone wants," says another former Agency psychologist.
"And with the PAS you can find out what it is. It's not necessarily sex
or booze. Sometimes it's status or recognition or security." Yet another
Gittinger colleague describes this process as "looking for soft spots."
He states that after years of working with the system, he still bridled
at a few of the more fiendish ways "to get at people" that his colleagues
dreamed up He stayed on until retirement, however, and he adds, "None of
this was personal. It was for national security reasons."
A few years ago, ex-CIA psychologist James Keehner
told reporter Maureen Orth that he personally went to New York in 1969
to give Wechsler tests to an American nurse who had volunteered her body
for her country. "We wanted her to sleep with this Russian," explained
Keehner. "Either the Russian would fall in love with her and defect, or
we'd blackmail him. I had to see if she could sleep with him over a period
of time and not get involved emotionally. Boy, was she tough!" Keehner
noted that he became disgusted with entrapment techniques, especially after
watching a film of an agent in bed with a "recruitment target." He pointed
out that Agency case officers, many of whom "got their jollies" from such
work, used a hidden camera to get their shots. The sexual technology developed
in the MKULTRA safehouses in New York and San Francisco had been put to
work. The operation worked no better in the 1960s, however, than TSS officials
predicted such activities would a decade earlier. "You don't really recruit
agents with sexual blackmail," Keehner concluded. "That's why I couldn't
even take reading the files after a while. I was sickened at seeing people
take pleasure in other people's inadequacies. First of all, I thought it
was just dumb. For all the money going out, nothing ever came back."
Keehner became disgusted by the picking-at-scabs
aspect of TSS assessment work. Once the PAS had identified a target as
having potential mental instabilities, staff members sometimes suggested
ways to break him down, reasoning that by using a ratchet-like approach
to put him under increased pressure, they might be able to break the lines
that tied him to his country, if not to his sanity. Keehner stated, "I
was sent to deal with the most negative aspects of the human condition.
It was planned destructiveness. First, you'd check to see if you could
destroy a man's marriage. If you could, then that would be enough to put
a lot of stress on the individual, to break him down. Then you might start
a minor rumor campaign against him. Harass him constantly. Bump his car
in traffic. A lot of it is ridiculous, but it may have a cumulative effect."
Agency case officers might also use this same sort of stress-producing
campaign against a particularly effective enemy intelligence officer whom
they knew they could never recruit but whom they hoped to neutralize.
Most operations-including most recruitments-did
not rely on such nasty methods. The case officer still benefited from the
TSS staffs assessment, but he usually wanted to minimize stress rather
than accentuate it. CIA operators tended to agree that the best way to
recruit an agent was to make the relationship as productive and satisfying
as possible for him, operating from the old adage about catching more flies
with honey than vinegar. "You pick the thing most fearful to him-the things
which would cause him the most doubt," says the source. "If his greatest
fear is that he can't trust you to protect him and his family, you overload
your pitch with your ability to do it. Other people need structure, so
you tell them exactly what they will need to do. If you leave it open-ended,
they'll be scared you'll ask them to do things they're incapable of."[5]
Soon after the successful recruitment of a foreigner
to spy for the CIA, either a CIA staff member or a specially trained case
officer normally sat down with the new agent and gave him the full battery
of Wechsler subtests-a process that took several hours. The tester never
mentioned that the exercise had anything to do with personality but called
it an "aptitude" test-which it also is. The assessments office in Washington
then analyzed the results. As with the polygraph, the PAS helped tell if
the agent were lying. It could often delve deeper than surface concepts
of true and false. The PAS might show that the agent's motivations were
not in line with his behavior. In that case, if the gap were too great,
the case officer could expect to run up against considerable deception-resulting
either from espionage motives or psychotic tendencies.
The TSS staff assessors sent a report back to the
field on the best way to deal with the new agent and the most effective
means to exploit him. They would recommend whether his case officer should
treat him sternly or permissively. If the agent were an Externalizer who
needed considerable companionship, the assessors might suggest that the
case officer try to spend as much time with him as possible.[6]
They would probably recommend against sending this E agent on a long mission
into a hostile country, where he could not have the friendly company he
craved.
Without any help from John Gittinger or his system,
covert operators had long been deciding matters like these, which were,
after all, rooted in common sense. Most case officers prided themselves
on their ability to play their agents like a musical instrument, at just
the right tempo, and the Gittinger system did not shake their belief that
nothing could beat their own intuition. Former CIA Deputy Director Ray
Cline expresses a common view when he says the PAS "was part of the system-kind
of a check-and-balance-a supposedly scientific tool that was not weighed
very heavily. I never put as much weight on the psychological assessment
reports as on a case officer's view.... In the end, people went with their
own opinion." Former Director William Colby found the assessment reports
particularly useful in smoothing over that "traumatic" period when a case
officer had to pass on his agent to a replacement. Understandably, the
agent often saw the switch as a danger or a hardship. "The new guy has
to show some understanding and sympathy," says Colby, who had 30 years
of operational experience himself, "but it doesn't work if these feelings
are not real."
For those Agency officers who yearned to remove
as much of the human element as possible from agent operations, Gittinger's
system was a natural. It reduced behavior to a workable formula of shorthand
letters that, while not insightful in all respects, gave a reasonably accurate
description of a person. Like Social Security numbers, such formulas fitted
well with a computerized approach. While not wanting to overemphasize the
Agency's reliance on the PAS, former Director Colby states that the system
made dealing with agents "more systematized, more professional."
In 1963 the CIA's Inspector General gave the TSS
assessment staff high marks and described how it fit into operations:
The [Clandestine Services] case officer is first and foremost, perhaps, a practitioner of the art of assessing and exploiting human personality and motivations for ulterior purposes. The ingredients of advanced skill in this art are highly individualistic in nature, including such qualities as perceptiveness and imagination. [The PAS] seeks to enhance the case officer's skill by bringing the methods and disciplines of psychology to bear.... The prime objectives are control, exploitation, or neutralization. These objectives are innately anti-ethical rather than therapeutic in their intent.
In other words, the PAS is directed toward the
relationship between the American case officer and his foreign agent, that
lies at the heart of espionage. In that sense, it amounts to its own academic
discipline-the psychology of spying-complete with axioms and reams of empirical
data. The business of the PAS, like that of the CIA, is control.
One former CIA psychologist, who still feels guilty
about his participation in certain Agency operations, believes that the
CIA's fixation on control and manipulation mirrors, in a more virulent
form, the way Americans deal with each other generally. "I don't think
the CIA is too far removed from the culture," he says. "It's just a matter
of degree. If you put a lot of money out there, there are many people who
are lacking the ethics even of the CIA. At least the Agency had an ideological
basis." This psychologist believes that the United States has become an
extremely control-oriented society-from the classroom to politics to television
advertising. Spying and the PAS techniques are unique only in that they
are more systematic and secret.
Another TSS scientist believes that the Agency's
behavioral research was a logical extension of the efforts of American
psychologists, psychiatrists, and sociologists to change behavior-which
he calls their "sole motivation." Such people manipulate their subjects
in trying to make mentally disturbed people well, in turning criminals
into law-abiding citizens, in improving the work of students, and in pushing
poor people to get off welfare. The source cites all of these as examples
of "behavior modification" for socially acceptable reasons, which, like
public attitudes toward spying, change from time to time. "Don't get the
idea that all these behavioral scientists were nice and pure, that they
didn't want to change anything, and that they were detached in their science,"
he warns. "They were up to their necks in changing people. It just happened
that the things they were interested in were not always the same as what
we were." Perhaps the saving grace of the behavioral scientists is summed
up by longtime MKULTRA consultant Martin Orne: "We are sufficiently ineffective
so that our findings can be published." With the PAS, CIA officials had
a handy tool for social engineering. The Gittinger staff found one use
for it in the sensitive area of selecting members of foreign police and
intelligence agencies. All over the globe, Agency operators have frequently
maintained intimate working relations with security services that have
consistently mistreated their own citizens. The assessments staff played
a key role in choosing members of the secret police in at least two countries
whose human-rights records are among the world's worst.
In 1961, according to TSS psychologist John Winne,
the CIA and the Korean government worked together to establish the newly
created Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The American CIA station
in Seoul asked headquarters to send out an assessor to "select the initial
cadre" of the KCIA. Off went Winne on temporary duty. "I set up an office
with two translators," he recalls, "and used a Korean version of the Wechsler."
The Agency psychologist gave the tests to 25 to 30 police and military
officers and wrote up a half-page report on each, listing their strengths
and weaknesses. Winne wanted to know about each candidate's "ability to
follow orders, creativity, lack of personality disorders, motivation-why
he wanted out of his current job. It was mostly for the money, especially
with the civilians." The test results went to the Korean authorities, whom
Winne believes made the personnel decisions "in conjunction with our operational
people."
"We would do a job like this and never get feedback,
so we were never sure we'd done a good job," Winne complains. Sixteen years
after the end of his mission to Seoul and after news of KCIA repression
at home and bribes to American congressmen abroad, Winne feels that his
best efforts had "boomeranged." He states that Tongsun Park was not one
of the KCIA men he tested.
In 1966 CIA staffers, including Gittinger himself,
took part in selecting members of an equally controversial police unit
in Uruguay-the anti-terrorist section that fought the Tupamaro urban guerrillas.
According to John Cassidy, the CIA's deputy station chief there at the
time, Agency operators worked to set up this special force together with
the Agency for International Development's Public Safety Mission (whose
members included Dan Mitrione, later kidnapped and killed by the Tupamaros).
The CIA-assisted police claimed they were in a life-and-death struggle
against the guerrillas, and they used incredibly brutal methods, including
torture, to stamp out most of the Uruguayan left along with the guerrillas.
While the special police were being organized, "John
[Gittinger] came down for three days to get the program underway," recalls
Cassidy. Then Hans Greiner, a Gittinger associate, ran Wechslers on 20
Uruguayan candidates. One question on the information subtest was "How
many weeks in the year?" Eighteen of the 20 said it was 48, and only one
man got the answer right. (Later he was asked about his answer, and he
said he had made a mistake; he meant 48.) But when Greiner asked this same
group of police candidates, "Who wrote Faust?" 18 of the 20 knew
it was Goethe. "This tells you something about the culture," notes Cassidy,
who served the Agency all over Latin America. It also points up the difficulty
Gittinger had in making the PAS work across cultural lines.
In any case, CIA man Cassidy found the assessment
process most useful for showing how to train the anti-terrorist section.
"According to the results, these men were shown to have very dependent
psychologies and they needs d strong direction," recalls the now-retired
operator. Cassidy was quite pleased with the contribution Gittinger and
Greiner made. "For years I had been dealing with Latin Americans," says
Cassidy, "and here, largely by psychological tests, one of [Gittinger's]
men was able to analyze people he had no experience with and give me some
insight into them.... Ordinarily, we would have just selected the men and
gone to work on them."
In helping countries like South Korea and Uruguay
pick their secret police, TSS staff members often inserted a devilish twist
with the PAS. They could not only choose candidates who would make good
investigators, interrogators, or whatever, but they could also spot those
who were most likely to succumb to future CIA blandishments. "Certain types
were more recruitable," states a former assessor. "I looked for them when
I wrote my reports.... Anytime the Company [the CIA] spent money for training
a foreigner, the object was that he would ultimately serve our control
purposes." Thus, CIA officials were not content simply to work closely
with these foreign intelligence agencies; they insisted on penetrating
them, and the PAS provided a useful aid.
In 1973 John Gittinger and his longtime associate
John Winne, who picked KCIA men, published a basic description of the PAS
in a professional journal. Although others had written publicly about the
system, this article apparently disturbed some of the Agency's powers,
who were then cutting back on the number of CIA employees at the order
of short-time Director James Schlesinger.
Shortly thereafter, Gittinger, then 56, stopped
being president of Psychological Assessment Associates but stayed on as
a consultant. In 1974 I wrote about Gittinger's work, albeit incompletely,
in
Rolling Stone magazine. Gittinger was disturbed that disclosure
of his CIA connection would hurt his professional reputation. "Are we tarred
by a brush because we worked for the CIA?" he asked during one of several
rather emotional exchanges. "I'm proud of it." He saw no ethical problems
in "looking for people's weaknesses" if it helped the CIA obtain information,
and he declared that for many years most Americans thought this was a useful
process. At first, he offered to give me the Wechsler tests and prepare
a personality assessment to explain the system, but Agency officials prohibited
his doing so. "I was given no explanation," said the obviously disappointed
Gittinger. "I'm very proud of my professional work, and I had looked forward
to being able to explain it."
In August 1977 Gittinger publicly testified in Senate
hearings. While he obviously would have preferred talking about his psychological
research, his most persistent questioner, Senator Edward Kennedy, was much
more interested in bringing out sensational details about prostitutes and
drug testing. A proud man, Gittinger felt "humiliated" by the experience,
which ended with him looking foolish on national television. The next month,
the testimony of his former associate, David Rhodes, further bruised Gittinger.
Rhodes told the Kennedy subcommittee about Gittinger's role in leading
the "Gang that Couldn't Spray Straight" in an abortive attempt to test
LSD in aerosol cans on unwitting subjects. Gittinger does not want his
place in history to be determined by this kind of activity. He would like
to see his Personality Assessment System accepted as an important contribution
to science.
Tired of the controversy and worn down by trying
to explain the PAS, Gittinger has moved back to his native Oklahoma. He
took a copy of the 29,000 Wechsler results with him, but he has lost his
ardor for working with them. A handful of psychologists around the country
still swear by the system and try to pass it on to others. One, who uses
it in private practice, says that in therapy it saves six months in understanding
the patient. This psychologist takes a full reading of his patient's personality
with the PAS, and then he varies his treatment to fit the person's problems.
He believes that most American psychologists and psychiatrists treat their
patients the same whereas the PAS is designed to identify the differences
between people. Gittinger very much hopes that others will accept this
view and move his system into the mainstream. "It means nothing unless
I can get someone else to work on it," he declares. Given the preconceptions
of the psychological community, the inevitable taint arising from the CIA's
role in developing the system, and Gittinger's lack of academic credentials
and energy, his wish will probably not be fulfilled.