'Derivatives lurk at the epicenter of global financial crisis risk. It's right here where global central bank policies have fomented the greatest distortions and associated fragilities: The perception - the implied guarantees - of liquid and continuous markets. And when DB's stock is sinking (down 13%) and its CDS is blowing out (33bps this week!), then the issue of counterparty risk and derivative market dislocation begins to creep into market psychology (and positioning).
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I couldn't help but to ponder the possibility that the rising cost of hedging dollar risk is a game changer for U.S. corporate debt. There's a huge amount of leverage there, along with big foreign ownership. It's certainly not a strong position for instigating tariffs and risking trade wars. It's instead a backdrop increasingly susceptible to panic selling, liquidity shocks and derivative issues.''Alan Greenspan was the master of obfuscation. His conversations seemed guided by some game theory, and I was too often left pondering what went unsaid - and why. Greenspan's ego, free-market ideology and personal ambitions over time fostered an overly-powerful cult status. With direction from an intellectual advocate, market pricing mechanisms can be all the more awe-inspiring. The wonder of bolstering securities markets with a few enlightened words or, when necessary, 25 bps. No unelected individual should ever assume such power. And when a central banker is idolized in real time, he's surely too accommodative. As financial innovation quickened and Bubble Dynamics took hold, Greenspan became incapable of correcting - or even admitting - mistakes.
Ben Bernanke had his own issues. Dr. Bernanke's formidable biases revolved around his academic research and unconventional theories. His limited experience with the markets only heightened the insecurities facing anyone replacing "The Maestro." Bernanke had spent much of his academic career fashioning his theory that the Fed's failure to print money after the 1929 crash was the prevailing cause of the Great Depression. A seemingly modest man had become convinced he'd unearthed the "Holy Grail of Economics". He promised Milton Friedman on his 90th birthday that the Fed had learned from its catastrophic mistake and wouldn't allow it to happen again. The opportunity presented itself early in his term as chairman, and Bernanke unleashed history's greatest monetary experiment. His radical reflationary doctrine captivated - and then changed - the world.
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Chair Yellen followed too comfortably in Dr. Bernanke's footsteps. The unassuming market darling that wouldn't dare do anything that might rock the boat; another seasoned academic with a theoretical framework that essentially posed no risk to raging market Bubbles. Gratified that unemployment was declining as core consumer inflation stayed below target, she discerned nothing problematic unfolding in the markets or economy that might risk future crisis. In the final analysis, it was a four-year term notable for a complete failure to tighten financial conditions when the backdrop beckoned for significant tightening measures. No "gun slinger", but a competent and pleasant enabler of vicious "Terminal Phase" Bubble excess.
This history rehash is to emphasize the stark contrast between Chairman Powell and his predecessors. He's from a completely different mold. For the first time in decades, the Fed Chairman is not beholden to ideology, academic theory nor activist monetary doctrine..
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The Libor/OIS interbank Credit spread widened further this week, indicative of tightening liquidity conditions. It's my view that risk premiums are now generally rising partially on concerns for the Fed and global central bank liquidity backstops. For years, the implied central bank market backstop worked to depress the cost of all varieties of market "insurance" - from the VIX in U.S. equities, to hedging costs in global equities, corporate Credit, sovereign debt and, last but certainly not least, the currencies. The scope of Bubbles has inflated tremendously, while confidence in the future efficacy of central bank support measures has just begun to wane. The cost of market protection is now rising rapidly, with profound ramifications for myriad interrelated global Bubbles.
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Derivatives lurk at the epicenter of global financial crisis risk. It's right here where global central bank policies have fomented the greatest distortions and associated fragilities: The perception - the implied guarantees - of liquid and continuous markets. And when DB's stock is sinking (down 13%) and its CDS is blowing out (33bps this week!), then the issue of counterparty risk and derivative market dislocation begins to creep into market psychology (and positioning).
Greed to Fear. "Risk On" shifting to "Risk Off." This week had the feel of de-risking/de-leveraging dynamics gathering important momentum. This was no VIX (24.87 close) accident. It was a general widening of Credit spreads, waning liquidity and overall market instability. Dollar weakness reemerged this week, which sparked a nice safe haven bid in gold and the precious metals. Crude surged. Curiously, it also awakened a bit of safe haven buying for Treasuries (pushing corporate Credit spreads wider).
I couldn't help but to ponder the possibility that the rising cost of hedging dollar risk is a game changer for U.S. corporate debt. There's a huge amount of leverage there, along with big foreign ownership. It's certainly not a strong position for instigating tariffs and risking trade wars. It's instead a backdrop increasingly susceptible to panic selling, liquidity shocks and derivative issues.'
- Doug Noland,
Regime Change, March 24, 2018
Context'I define a Bubble as a self-reinforcing but inevitably unsustainable inflation. Household Net Worth at 500% of GDP is not sustainable..'