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'..A tsar confident in his domestic standing wouldn’t feel it necessary to incur the cost of such a provocation.'

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“With the Russians it’s always, ‘We want this next little thing.’” - Bryan Clark

'“[The Sea of Azov] was always considered internal waters of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before that,” said Handl, the Tulane professor. “Everything changed in 1991.”

Despite Russia’s historic dominion over the Kerch Strait, it would be hard to see this situation as anything but the latest small move by Russia that adds up to a massive intrusion on Ukraine’s sovereignty, said Bryan Clark, a former top aide to former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert and analyst with the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“With the Russians it’s always, ‘We want this next little thing,’” Clark said.

“Before the annexation of the Crimea it was, ‘We want unfettered access to Sevastopol,’” he continued, referencing the home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. “Well that turned into, ‘Now we are going to annex Crimea.’ So, it’s ‘the next little thing’ that doesn’t seem too escalatory, but then when you look back on it all the sudden you’ve lost territory or sovereignty to the Russians.”'

- David B. Larter and Matthew Bodner, The Sea of Azov won’t become the new South China Sea (and Russia knows it), November 29, 2018



'..A tsar confident in his domestic standing wouldn’t feel it necessary to incur the cost of such a provocation.'

'This raises an interesting thought: if Putin really thinks he needs a domestic political boost so badly that he is willing to draw international opprobrium (note that Trump canceled a meeting with him at the G-20 over this) to get it, what does that say about his domestic political position? Or at least his concerns about it. A tsar confident in his domestic standing wouldn’t feel it necessary to incur the cost of such a provocation.

..

Revealed preference suggests two alternatives: (a) Putin figured that sanctions relief was extremely remote in any event, so the cost wasn’t that high, or (b) Putin actually doesn’t mind sanctions despite their evident toll on the Russian economy. With regards to (b), note that sanctions often work to the advantage of those in power (e.g., Saddam, the Mullahs). Pieces like this suggest that might be a real possibility.

What was Ukrainian president Poroshenko’s rationale? He was likely appealing to his domestic audience, although a humiliating capture of a part of Ukraine’s pitiful remnant of a fleet hardly seems calculated to boost his re-election prospects. Perhaps he was hoping for this very outcome, in the expectation that it would lead western countries to rally to Ukraine’s defense. If so, he’s rather clueless. It’s not as if the US and EU are unaware of Russia’s continuing predation against Ukraine: they’ve clearly acquiesced to the current status quo of frozen conflict, and the events in the Kerch Strait will not change that. Poroshenko likely threw away a few ships and a couple of dozen sailors for nothing.

But in some respects, this is not surprising. The Ukrainians are the Sovok Palestinians: they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, and routinely self-inflict gaping wounds.

His declaration of martial law in parts of the country in the aftermath is highly weird, and raises questions about his real motives.

Does the incident portend a renewed Russian military assault on Ukraine? I doubt it: it is more of an enforcement of existing redlines, rather than drawing new borders. If the cost of bashing around a tugboat and a few minor combatants is bearable, the cost of a major move on the ground is a different matter altogether.

So the upshot is something like this. The incident will not result in substantial increases in help for Ukraine. It deepens and cements Russia’s isolation. It is unlikely to portend a major escalation in the conflict. In other words, it confirms and reinforces the status quo of a frozen conflict, rather than representing a new phase in the war.'

- Streewise Professor, The Incident in the Kerch Strait: Validating Existing Lines of Conflict, Rather Than Portending a Forcible Shift in Those Lines, November 29, 2018



Context

'The opportunity exists to end this war, to restore Ukraine’s control over its Donbas region..'