'Citing Alexander Wendt, Radchenko writes that Russian self-identity in the early 1990s was determined in the struggle of two narratives that legitimized political elites: one of partnership and one of confrontation with the West. It is not entirely clear why he singled out only two. There were potentially more, and the Russian establishment could have chosen any of them to pursue their own legitimization.
There could have been a narrative of Russia as a leader of democratization in the post-Soviet space. Even Kozyrev sometimes voiced this idea. Another narrative could have applied Karl Deutsch’s vision of a 'security-community' to Russia and Europe. In other words, the Russian government could have pursued substantive Euro-Atlantic integration – not just on paper – by creating true democratic institutions and deep structural reforms. They could have done this regardless of the NATO and EU’s final verdict on Russia’s membership.
Yes, these modes of domestic legitimization would have been thornier and more difficult. But if Russian elites are so cynical to choose the most crude and simplest methods of legitimizing their power at home, then is it fair to blame the West for not being 'idealistic' enough toward Russia..''The Russian public’s anti-Western mood, compounded by the planned economy’s collapse, proved to be a true gold mine of political capital that elites could rapidly exploit. Yeltsin’s inner circle doubtlessly understood this. This is why in August 1993, when the Russian president declared that he would not oppose Poland and the Czech Republic entering NATO, even such outspoken ‘Atlanticists’ as Andrey Kozyrev and Georgiy Mamedov pulled their hair and did everything in their power to retract their boss’s statement. As it turned out, the phobias and complexes of
Homo sovieticus were ripe for exploitation in politics. Surrendering this card to opponents would have been a great political mistake.
Yeltsin got a dose of this reality after the parliamentary elections of December 1993, when the majority unexpectedly voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s radically nationalist LDPR. This party called for recreating a neo-imperial, authoritarian model of government and viewed the West exclusively as an enemy. As Alexey Pushkov once said, 'if Kremlin rulers give up the theme of Russian greatness to the opposition, they risk switching places with the opposition very quickly'.
Yeltsin naturally had no plans to leave office. Therefore, his team constantly made use of great power rhetoric. Following the LDPR’s euphoric victory, the Kremlin started eagerly copying the party’s anti-Western slogans and incorporating them in official discourse. Immediately after the elections, in January 1994, Kozyrev held a meeting with his ambassadors. There he outlined two new strategic foreign policy priorities: the protection of Russian compatriots in former Soviet republics and the continuity of Russia’s military presence there. The Foreign Minister explained this with the danger of a 'strategic vacuum' being filled by 'unfriendly forces', meaning NATO. In the following days, Russia took a more hardline stance on Bosnia and Iraq. The Kremlin also threw direct accusations of global hegemony at Washington.
The Kremlin’s narrative did not return to anti-Western confrontation when 'it became apparent that Russia would not be able to join NATO', as Radchenko writes. Rather, it returned when Yeltsin saw his grip on power threatened. The Kremlin never seriously pondered the question of Russian NATO membership. In fact, there is not even one official strategy document that mentions joining NATO or the EU as a worthwhile foreign policy goal for Russia.
..
Citing Alexander Wendt, Radchenko writes that Russian self-identity in the early 1990s was determined in the struggle of two narratives that legitimized political elites: one of partnership and one of confrontation with the West. It is not entirely clear why he singled out only two. There were potentially more, and the Russian establishment could have chosen any of them to pursue their own legitimization.
There could have been a narrative of Russia as a leader of democratization in the post-Soviet space. Even Kozyrev sometimes voiced this idea. Another narrative could have applied Karl Deutsch’s vision of a 'security-community' to Russia and Europe. In other words, the Russian government could have pursued substantive Euro-Atlantic integration – not just on paper – by creating true democratic institutions and deep structural reforms. They could have done this regardless of the NATO and EU’s final verdict on Russia’s membership.
Yes, these modes of domestic legitimization would have been thornier and more difficult. But if Russian elites are so cynical to choose the most crude and simplest methods of legitimizing their power at home, then is it fair to blame the West for not being 'idealistic' enough toward Russia? If the Kremlin prefers to preach Russia’s great power status and shake its fist at Washington for domestic approval and electoral points, then it clearly is not the West’s fault.'
- Igor Gretski,
Could the West have saved Russia from itself? No, May 25, 2021
ContextTo Russia, Without Love: Expulsion Of Diplomats Hampers Kremlin Spy Work In Prague, May 30, 2021
(Bazaarmodel)(Teal - To Heal) - '..to let the individuals and organizations search or really think about the meaning of life.''..arguing for a “global concert of major powers” — the U.S., China, India, Japan, Russia and the European Union — to conduct an ongoing conversation about great issues.'