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(The Strategy of Denial) - '..the Cold War is an example of the United States successfully executing a multi-decade competition against a global authoritarian rival .. decoupling is inevitable..'

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'Kishi told Wei on Monday that "Japan strongly opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion and any activities that increase the tension over the South China Sea issue," specifically citing the new coast guard law, according to Japan's Defense Ministry.'

- Japan and China agree to set up defense hotline amid territorial tensions, December 28, 2021



'President Biden, speaking at a town hall meeting last week, said that “we have a commitment” to defend Taiwan. But the White House then issued a statement clarifying that the U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan is guided by the “Taiwan Relations Act,” which was signed into law in 1979.

It also promises to provide the island nation with defensive weapons and states that it will maintain the capacity to react to “any resort to force or forms of coercion” that would endanger security on Taiwan.

..

..in his book The Strategy of Denial, former deputy assistant secretary of defense Elbridge A. Colby argues that in any hot conflict the United States must defend Taiwan.

Colby contends that together with its allies, the United States could both win such a conflict and prevent it from spreading beyond the South China Sea.

But it appears that China may have begun to overestimate the strength of its military power relative to that of the United States.

That could, of course, lead to dangerous miscalculations on Beijing’s part.'

- US, China solidify strategies toward each other amid low-key diplomacy, November 28, 2021



'If I had to pick six major actors to lead a new democratic era, it would be the U.S., India, Britain, France, Japan, and Australia, and of course there are many other important players too. However, the level of strategic, economic, and military coordination between these actors is still very limited on challenges coming from both Russia and China.

..

..focus on winning the economic competition, working together to integrate our democratic friends and allies around the world, and maintaining our military and technological edge over both China and Russia. We should focus on our own vision of the future, and on beginning to rebuild a world that is less dependent on authoritarian China – a place which economic engagement has failed to change. China has systemic issues to be sure, but we must work to build our own strengths if we are going to win the long-term competition.'


'The U.S.-China contest will be a unique and original competition. Unlike the Cold War which was predominantly an ideological contest, this competition is likely to be an economic contest with military and ideological dimensions coming close behind. U.S.-China competition does have important parallels with the Cold War. First, it is likely to be a long-term, multi-decade, global contest between an authoritarian superpower and a democratic superpower. The goals of the Chinese Communist Party, as described in China’s Vision of Victory, may be even more ambitious than those of the USSR – the CCP envisions a future in which China ascends to the top of every major industry and technology, in which most of the world’s continents and markets are linked together with China as the economic and strategic center, and in which China has built a military that “can effectively secure China’s overseas interests.” The ultimate rise of China, if fully realized, could look more like the British Empire than an economically weak USSR engaged in global ideological struggle with the U.S.

The goals of the Chinese Communist Party present a clear and open challenge for U.S. global leadership. We should also remember that the Cold War is an example of the United States successfully executing a multi-decade competition against a global authoritarian rival, ending in victory for the free and democratic world. We too can think and plan for long-term competition.

..

..decoupling is inevitable, particularly where it can help preserve a competitive edge in critical technologies and industries that are needed for long-term competition. China’s program of harvesting technology from the developed world during the last 20 years of integration has yielded major results, but China still depends on economic engagement in order to build its technological and industrial advantages. Additionally, the Communist Party executes much of its global strategy through its companies and financial institutions, which can act – unlike U.S. companies – as arms of the state .. Providing the Chinese Communist Party with any further advantages through economic integration seems unwise in a long-term competition. Additionally, China’s surveillance state and human rights abuses, especially in Xinjiang, present reputational risks for American investors and corporates that are seeking opportunities in China, and given the role of Chinese companies in creating the surveillance state, human rights abuses will also impact economic engagement with China as long-term competition sets in.

..

U.S. alliances will be vital to this contest but we will have to be thinking globally as allies where we are now thinking regionally. This is where Cold War origins serve us badly, I think. Our alliance structures were arguably built around the geography of the Cold War world – that is, NATO to defend Europe and Allied Asia to defend the Asia-Pacific. In today’s global contest, however, we will need our allies to think and act globally – better integration between Europe, Asia, and the United States is essential. It won’t work for Europe to view China as an economic partner, while thinking only about European regional security, for example. There is a huge opportunity for European allies to become important Indo-Pacific actors, and for the U.S. to lead on European-Asian integration which, for the moment, is only being expressed in China’s “Belt and Road.”

If I had to pick six major actors to lead a new democratic era, it would be the U.S., India, Britain, France, Japan, and Australia, and of course there are many other important players too. However, the level of strategic, economic, and military coordination between these actors is still very limited on challenges coming from both Russia and China. The world’s democracies are still about 65 percent of the global economy and if we work together and find alternatives to China, we are going to be successful at preserving a world order in which democratic norms and freedoms continue to prevail. If we fail to do this, however, China may enjoy a relatively unimpeded rise to power – and let’s not forget that China has quite a range of adherents too, from Russia to Pakistan, all of which have important strategic value in helping China distract its adversaries and achieve its goals.

..

..focus on winning the economic competition, working together to integrate our democratic friends and allies around the world, and maintaining our military and technological edge over both China and Russia. We should focus on our own vision of the future, and on beginning to rebuild a world that is less dependent on authoritarian China – a place which economic engagement has failed to change. China has systemic issues to be sure, but we must work to build our own strengths if we are going to win the long-term competition.'

- Jonathan Ward (Understanding China’s Vision of Victory, May 26, 2019)



Context

'..Xi .. Leninist version of Marxism .. “Document 9,” which condemned the core values and key institutions of liberal democracy.'

Uyghurs subjected to genocide by China, unofficial UK tribunal finds

China's Communist Party is a threat to the world, says former elite insider [Cai Xia]'