'Strictly speaking, all of this is directly and exclusively dependent on the resources available to Ukraine. While the situation with the number of forces is likely to look quite promising for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the same cannot be applied to heavy weaponry and ammunition. But, in any case, provided there is political will, timely and deliberate planning, with the use of the industrial base and reserves of the world’s leading powers, the task of setting up and properly equipping such groupings is seen as absolutely realistic.
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..Comprehensive efforts to equip and re-equip the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapon systems of the appropriate range, with a proper long-term vision of the objectives, should become the long-sought game-changer. Only by balancing out the weapons’ operating range, thus disturbing the said center of gravity for the enemy, can we get to a turning point in the ongoing war.
If Ukraine succeeds in receiving the appropriate weapons, operational and strategic prospects for 2023 will look totally different. The very threat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces employing means of destruction of the appropriate range will force Russia to reconsider the nature, course, and outcome of the ongoing confrontation.''The only way to radically change the strategic situation is undoubtedly for the Ukrainian Army to launch several consecutive, and ideally, simultaneous counterstrikes throughout 2023. It would be hard to overestimate their military, as well as political and informational, significance. At the same time, the issue of their planning and execution requires more attention.
The subject can be narrowed down to the following concept: what forces and means are needed to this end? If we consider the 2023 campaign as a turning point, we need to return to the definition of the Center of Gravity for Russia in this conflict. After all, only an effective influence on the enemy's center of gravity could change the course of the war.
Provided that such a center of gravity is control over Crimea, it is logical to assume planning for 2023 an operation or a series of operations to regain the peninsula. Such planning must first of all assume that the necessary pool of troops is available..
..a need should be highlighted to obtain more missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile launchers, EW assets, etc. All of this will require consolidated efforts of all partner countries, while taking up a significant amount of time and financial resources.
Strictly speaking, all of this is directly and exclusively dependent on the resources available to Ukraine. While the situation with the number of forces is likely to look quite promising for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the same cannot be applied to heavy weaponry and ammunition. But, in any case, provided there is political will, timely and deliberate planning, with the use of the industrial base and reserves of the world’s leading powers, the task of setting up and properly equipping such groupings is seen as absolutely realistic.
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We are talking, of course, about Ukraine's partners supplying the relevant weapon systems or certain types of ammunition with the appropriate range. And it’s so much about some certain models, such as, for example, the MGM-140B ATACMS Block 1A missile for the M142 HIMARS. A comprehensive approach must be applied to re-equipping artillery and missile forces, tactical aviation, Navy, and other components of Ukraine’s military might. The discussion should address creating or developing capabilities, not just the amount of weapons and equipment to be supplied to brigades slated for re-equipment.
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..Comprehensive efforts to equip and re-equip the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapon systems of the appropriate range, with a proper long-term vision of the objectives, should become the long-sought game-changer. Only by balancing out the weapons’ operating range, thus disturbing the said center of gravity for the enemy, can we get to a turning point in the ongoing war.
If Ukraine succeeds in receiving the appropriate weapons, operational and strategic prospects for 2023 will look totally different. The very threat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces employing means of destruction of the appropriate range will force Russia to reconsider the nature, course, and outcome of the ongoing confrontation.
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In our opinion, it is precisely taking into account such a complex and ambiguous combination of factors that the prospects of the 2023 military campaign should be considered. Only their full and comprehensive consideration will create the prerequisites for Ukraine to defeat the aggressor’s army and put to an end the destructive war that is raging in Europe.'
General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, member of the National Security and Defense Council of UkraineLieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi is First Deputy Chairman of the National Security, Defense, and Intelligence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine-
Prospects for running a military campaign in 2023: Ukraine’s perspective, September 7, 2022
Context(Complete withdrawal from Ukraine (Crimea and the Donbas)) - '..large-scale retreat [of Russian troops recommended].'