Army
THE MAIN MILITARY SECRETBy Vladimir Voronov
September 2006
SourceWhat the commander-in-chief keeps silent about
In November 2005, the commander-in-chief addressed the annual meeting of army commanders and praised them and the bodies entrusted to them. “First of all, I would like to make a favorable assessment of your work on the whole,” President Putin said. “The army and navy properly carry out the task of protecting the security and national interests of the country.”
One would think it is a ritual phrase and at an ordinary meeting. But this is not that simple. The year is not ordinary, it is a concluding year. In 2000, the Defense Ministry adopted a plan to build up the armed forces in the period till 2005. It would appear the results of the five-year plan can be summed up. But this is not so. Nothing has been said about the plan since 2002, and it will apparently never be mentioned. At the 2005 meeting, the commander-in-chief did not say a word about it.
Revelations in NovemberPutin’s November meetings with the generals allow us to compare the speeches he made in different years and draw interesting information about the state of the Russian military. Even more can be learned by noting what was not said.
The speech delivered by Putin in November 2000 was a significant and frank revelation. He assessed the situation in the armed forces in a very critical way: the system’s functioning was unbalanced and ineffective, “the moral, disciplinary and technical state of the troops and commanders did not fit the aims and scale of their tasks. We continue to talk and meet, but the fly-wheel of reforms runs idle to a large extent. Our decisions are still carried out partially or with distortions.”
For the first and only time, the commander-in-chief publicly lashed out at the command personnel. A third of the officers whose term of service was to be prolonged, officers aged over 60, and many candidates were found guilty of abusing their positions. Only few high-ranking officials of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff were former commanders of armies or chiefs of headquarters of military districts. The vast majority of them made their career only in the Moscow headquarters.
Putin tried to give his interpretation of the situation when he spoke about the causes of the disintegration of the USSR. “The main reason was the complete self-isolation of the country. It should be admitted it was the result of the great-power policy… All that led to isolation, to the overstraining of state resources, and laid the basis for the disintegration of the country.” This sober-minded analysis was followed by a no less pragmatic conclusion. “To maintain an excessively large military organization is inadmissible and foolish because it breaks up in the long run.” Later we did not hear such wise words from the president.
It can be supposed that the reason for statements of this kind is quite concrete. The bad situation in the Defense Ministry can be attributed to the predecessor and his team — that is, Sergeyev, a missileman, and Chief of Staff Kvashnin, who aspired to his post. Concealed behind the lofty words about building up the armed forces was a struggle for control over the military budget.
This explains why the president, who was taking the first steps to bring the Defense Ministry under his control, publicly told the army commanders to quiet down because the state had no money “to keep an excessively large military organization.” He clearly hinted that the Soviet Union had broken up because it was unable to bear the military burden.
A year later, we heard different speeches. In November 2001, it was not appropriate for the commander-in-chief to reprimand officials in the department headed by Sergei Ivanov, his own protege. That is why the president spoke in a laconic and business-like manner, saying, “We have finally started concrete, planned work to reform the army, eliminating the internal lack of balance and structural redundancy, and positive changes have been achieved.” However, what had been achieved remained unknown.
The events in the United States on September 11, 2001, luckily helped to define the enemy and the external threats. “In Chechnya,” the president said, “we have encountered mobilized and well-trained units of terrorists.” International terrorism is the main enemy now, and therefore we need a strong modern army. The continuation of military reform is a most important task for that reason. It is also necessary to find “the optimum structure for the armed forces.” The president did not explain how to do this, how he understands the military reform, or how the leaders of Russia see the new army.
The November 2002 meeting had its own interesting point. International terrorism was immediately declared the main threat. For that reason, it became necessary to amend the doctrine-type documents, find the optimum structure for the armed forces and establish more effective cooperation of the army with “law enforcement and other power bodies.”
Translated into normal language, this curious formula means that the main threats come not from outside at all, and the authorities should fear not so much aggression from without as from internal separatists. Putin’s words about “international terrorism” will obviously not delude the generals. It is significant, however, that the president did not risk calling things by their proper names at any November meeting.
Putin also said that “strict control over the allotted sums” must be established and called for “eliminating abuses.” Besides, it was clearly stated that “even the Defense Ministry often does not know where the state-allocated funds go.”
Finita la reformaThe most noteworthy of the November 2002 meeting is that military reform was not discussed any longer. Of course, no one said that it had been completed, postponed or messed up. But this notion, much hated by the generals, did not grate on their ears any longer.
This explains why the tenor of the November 2003 meeting was different. “The current modernization of the army is not only an important task of the state but, let me stress, an important task of the whole nation” because “we have passed from reforms necessary at the present stage to consistent and long-term development..., we are converting to qualitatively new armed forces.” Each of these phrases is a riddle. When was “the current modernization” started and what were its concrete forms? What does “development” mean? If the present stage of reforms was completed, what were its results? Where can one see qualitatively new armed forces?
No answers. But it was clearly stated: “Since 1992, the armed forces have been reduced by more than a half. This is enough. At this stage, the reduction has been completed on the whole.” The commander-in-chief noted further, “We hear much about the dominance of generals in the army. This is not true.” It is an interesting paradox: if the “optimization” was carried out, if the organization is in proper order and there are as many generals as needed, then how to explain the terrible shortage of soldiers?
If a peace-time army does not have enough soldiers, this indicates not only shortcomings in the manning system but inadequacy of the military organization. So far, attempts to recruit the needed number of soldiers have been in vain. It is necessary to change the structure by bringing it into correspondence with the mobilization possibilities of the present-day and future Russia. But then everything will have to be changed radically. It will be necessary to revise the system of combat training, the equipment of the armed forces, and logistics. The main thing is that it will also be necessary to reduce the number of officers and even generals, who will themselves reduce the officials threatening their sacred positions.
So, the Kremlin dares express only an abstract wish: “the army must be prepared not for wars fought in the last century but to repel the present-day and future threats.” But can such readiness be displayed by the generals of the last century, brought up in the Soviet army, thinking in Soviet army terms and nostalgic for the all-permissive behavior of the military in Soviet times, when they were given everything, and not as much as was really needed, but as much as Marshal Ustinov wanted? Such generals will be guided only by the notions of the past.
It seems that in 2005, the president is not concerned about the army any longer because, after solving the problem of 2008, he will have obviously no interest in the defensive capacity of Russia. This explains the optimistic tone of the November meeting this year. It seems we are witnessing “the transition from the long stage of the reforms” (what reforms?) “to the planned building of the army... and all-round growth of the possibilities of the national armed forces. The structure of the Defense Ministry has been practically optimized” (what was optimized?). Those who do not believe that everything is all right can be referred to the joint exercises with Indian, Chinese and Uzbek militaries. “Our partners noted the high training standard of the personnel of Russian army units.” The high appraisal given by the Chinese and Indian officials is valuable, of course, and especially valuable is the Uzbek appraisal.
But looking through the speeches of the defense minister, we discover that they hardly agree with what the president said. A year ago, Ivanov said, “The general-purpose forces can still be brought into combat readiness only if measures for raising their combat and mobilization readiness are carried out in good time.” Is a further explanation needed?
“It proved impossible in full measure to qualitatively improve the state and increase the combat potential of units of operational readiness to a level ensuring a rapid build-up in a threatened strategic area of a mobile and self-sufficient group of troops that can effectively ensure military security of the state, localize armed conflicts, and act in emergency situations,” we read further in Ivanov’s speech. The defense minister also revealed that many pilots leave the air force, the professionalism of naval commanders is falling sharply, and the level of crime in the army remains intolerably high.
At the meeting of this year, Ivanov also said, “Our sergeant is practically no different from his subordinates. Hazing is still practiced in some army units. Many crimes are still recorded in the army. Also disquieting is the intolerably high level of crime among the officers. Today, every seventh recorded crime is committed by our officers. The number of unlawful actions by senior officers increased almost by a third this year compared to last year. There is also a steady rise in the armed forces of such crimes as “embezzlement and the misappropriation of state, military property and funds.” It follows from Ivanov’s confession that fuel is stolen on a mass scale in the armed forces and the navy. And social problems have not been solved. Officers have no housing and use any opportunity to leave the army.
Four missilesThe most interesting thing is what the commander-in-chief keeps silent about at these meetings. He is silent about many things, such as the purchase of new military equipment, the real combat power of the armed forces and real enemies though potential nones. In particular, the president does not call things by their proper names. He does not say that the army must be prepared to fight on its own territory against its fellow citizens, because the main threat comes not from without but from within. It is separatism, and not only the Chechen one. If the present social, political and economic situation does not change, the army will have to fight sooner or later not against the mythic “international terrorism” but against quite concrete rebels to maintain the disintegrating network of the empire. But the Commander-in-chief did not say a word about that danger.
Even that is not all. The commander-in-chief said nothing about the strategic nuclear forces at any of the meetings. Well, he regularly talks about this subject to remind his audience that Russia still has such forces. The president speaks about this in his annual messages to the Federal Assembly in connection with a testing, or on the occasion of a successful launching of missiles (rare luck in our days). However, statements of this kind are intended only for civilian audience. Quite different statements are made at meetings with generals. No wonder that Putin said at one of such meetings: “We do not gather often.” It is improper to talk propaganda nonsense in front of generals. They will stop taking it seriously because they know the real situation. So, they talked about strategic nuclear forces at November meetings as people talk about the deceased — saying either nothing or making empty statements.
Nothing was said about nuclear forces at the meeting in 2000. It was only stated that “the main problem — the strategic containment and prevention of aggression — is being tackled successfully.” That’s all though an open conflict over nuclear strategic forces flared up between Defense Minister Sergeyev and Chief of General Staff Kvashnin in the spring of 2000. Kvashnin tried to persuade Putin that strategic missile forces should be included in the Air Force and the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles should be cut from 756 to 150. Sergeyev naturally protested, but by August 2000, the argument had been settled in favor of Kvashnin. The commander-in-chief was fully busy with the war in Chechnya, where strategic missile forces were not needed at all.
It was decided then to place the strategic missile forces under the control of the Air Force. The most combat-ready forces of that time came under the control of a branch that was in a state of degradation. They could have been placed under the control of a construction battalion with the same success. In general, it was indeed improper to talk about nuclear forces at the November 2000 meeting. But on second thought, the Kvashnin’s idea, which would have spelled the ruin of the nuclear forces, was blocked. But, if one stops to think, it will be clear that the essence of that conflict was the struggle of the generals over the budgetary funds.
In November 2001, the commander-in-chief was silent about nuclear forces, as if they did not exist at all. Neither anything was said about them in 2002 and 2003. Only in 2004, the first time in many years, did Putin speak on this subject. “We understand that other threats will appear,” he said, “if we relax our attention to the nuclear missile shield component of our defense. We will continue to build… the nuclear component. We are not only carrying out research and successful tests of modern nuclear missile systems… Our army will be equipped with them in the next few years. Moreover, other states have no such systems and will not have them in the next few years.” But these fine words were no substitute for real missiles. They discord with the almost childish joy of the defense minister, who enthusiastically reported first that the aircraft carrier Admiral of the Soviet Union’s Fleet Kuznetsov had finally come into service, and then that strategic submarines had launched ten intercontinental ballistic missiles. Then the minister made it clear that the main task was to “maintain the potential of the strategic deterrent forces.” The minister expressed the hope of receiving four more strategic missiles in 2005 for “maintaining the potential.”
In 2005, the president again noted “progress in modernizing the nuclear deterrent potential.” What does this progress mean? “Successful tests of promising systems of weapons have been carried out. They can ensure the guaranteed neutralization of all existing and future long-range anti-missile defense systems.” And that is all.
The state of nuclear forcesThe problem of strategic forces is not as simple and unimportant as it may seem. Let us not be deceived by the fact that Russia has hundreds of missiles. The nuclear missiles are in such a state that they can no longer give an adequate response to potential threats. Of course, no one expects the strategic missile forces to fight “international terrorists.” But they should be kept in a proper state to be able to ward off some neighbors striving to get a part of Russian territory.
A significant potential threat to Russia comes from China. Moscow’s policy towards this neighbor in the last few years shows that our nuclear missile affairs are worse than ever before. It can be firmly stated that, had our strategic forces been kept at a proper level, there would have been no talk of any territorial concessions to China. No advances would have been made and the demands for territorial concessions by Beijing, and not only Riga, would have been rejected.
Nevertheless, China has successfully enlarged its territory with a part of the Amur region. Let me repeat that this would not have happened if the state of the strategic nuclear forces had allowed Russia to deal confidently with its Far Eastern neighbor. But these forces are probably in such a terrible state that they can no longer be regarded as a serious counterbalance to the Chinese threat. That conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of speeches made by Putin at meetings with high army commanders or, more exactly, from his silence.
Incidentally, the air force commander Mikhailov said in January 2005 that Russia was prepared to sell some of its strategic bombers to Beijing and that the deal “can tangibly support the nuclear combat power of China.” That’s a truly touching concern about the fighting efficiency of our potential enemy! Those bombers can be used only against Russia. They won’t be allowed to reach the striking distance of the United States. However, it will be needless to enter the Russian air defense zone in order to destroy targets in Siberia and the Far East, paralyze communications there, and strike at the Pacific Fleet ships based in Vladivostok.
The leaky shield and the rusty swordLet us return to the shield, which formally consists of three components: strategic nuclear troops, and strategic naval and air forces. It is clear even from reports on exercises that the situation in the Navy and Air Force is quite bad. In any case, Russian submarines worry environmentalists more than they do NATO.
Russian experts admit despondently that even if some of our submarines reach the World Ocean, they will not remain unnoticed there and will be unable to take launching positions without obstruction. Theoretically, an attack can be delivered from their base area, but this makes senseless the existence of submarines carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles to be fired unexpectedly from places unknown to the enemy. Russian submarines are already unable to do that for a number of reasons, and one of them is fatal. They make so much noise that anti-submarine defense forces can detect them easily. A submarine unable to move quietly will inevitably be destroyed.
Incidentally, even if the intelligence service failed to detect a Russian missile-carrying submarine reaching its launching position, there are no guarantees that an intercontinental ballistic missile will be launched successfully. Failures have been constantly recorded in exercises in the last few years. There is one more problem. In the event of a successful launch, there are no guarantees that the missile will fly toward its target, not in the opposite direction. Such cases have often been recorded, too. Exercises held in recent years have dispelled the last illusions about the combat power of the Navy as a whole, and as the naval component of the Russian nuclear forces. To all appearances, this was the real cause of the dismissal of Kuroyedov from his post as commander of the Navy.
The Air Force seems to be even worse off. From 1992 to 1998, the strategic aircraft did not fly at all. Even if strategic bombers took off, they would hardly reach the missile launch point because of their tactical and technical characteristics. They would simply not be allowed to do so. Moreover, the number of operational planes is ridiculously small. Most of them stand idle for lack of spare parts and fuel. Meanwhile, the flying personnel are losing their skills and experienced personnel leaving the service.
Formally, Russia has no strategic aircraft. The Air Force has bomber aviation which, according to the Defense Ministry’s official website, “has strategic and tactical bombers of various types.” How can one seriously talk about the Air Force component if Russia had only 15 strategic Tu-160 bombers in 2003 and one of them crashed in September 2003?
There is no desire to consider the combat capability of Tu-95 and Tu-22, and not because they are old (Tu-95, for instance, was designed in 1952). They will be unable to reach positions from which missiles can be fired at the United States because they will be shot down first since the Russian Air Force is unable to provide protection for its strategic aircraft. Moreover, we can’t be sure that the missiles will hit the desired targets. A missile fired from a Tu-22 bomber on April 24, 2002, exploded on the Kazakh territory instead of hitting the target in the preset area.
Even Defense Minister Ivanov was forced to admit that “the level of training fliers in the Air Force units remains low.... This is explained by defects in aviation equipment and limited fuel supply. The accident rate remains high. Sixty percent of all aviation failures are caused by the human factor.”
Thus, our strategic aviators can launch missiles only in areas where they do not have to overcome an air defense system and where enemy fighters are unable to intercept them — that is, during exercises when there are no potential threats. Of course, the commander-in-chief will not tell the truth about that. But he will take part in exercises as a pilot of a Tu-160 bomber and will even successfully “launch” a missile though it is a circus performance, a profanation and a crude violation of aviation security norms, orders and instructions. But it is a spectacular public show and what a P.R!
There are still strategic missile forces armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are, virtually, the only combat-ready part of the nuclear triad. But in the last few years the state of these forces has worsened. The highly-skilled personnel left them, specialists of lower professional skills were hired, and the quality of the infrastructure of the missile troops has worsened. The old equipment is falling into decay as a result of natural aging and the lack of proper care, while the new equipment is not reliable because the production has degraded, the old skilled personnel has left. It is good if at least every second missile can be fired without problems. This means that at least two missiles are needed to guarantee the hitting of a target. However, a missile can fly in the wrong direction. As a result, three missiles are needed instead of one. But the country can’t afford that.
The president himself admitted at the first meeting of the army commanders that the Soviet Union had broken up under the onerous pressure of the military machine, the maintenance of which was unbearable. The armed forces had devoured all the resources and the reserve strength of the state.
However, Putin did not go further and admit that the Soviet military machine could not be used in Russia because the present-day Russia is not the USSR. This mechanically reproduced machine would demand all the national resources. (That is what the generals who want re-establishment of a military-industrial complex of the Soviet type are proposing.) That will mean inevitable collapse from strain (and the embezzlement of state property). Or else they demand the maintenance of an inefficient clone of the Soviet army that will also degrade, require ever more money and die in agony, poisoning everything healthy around it. The remaking of the Soviet army by means of reductions, without giving up the Soviet structure, has failed. Shall we reconcile ourselves to this? But it will in the end accelerate the break-up of Russia or at least predetermine it.
The only reasonable way out is to form a structure based on the real possibilities of the country, with due regard for potential threats. But the commander-in-chief is now tackling another problem — the problem of 2008.