'The belief that a military solution is possible — that if Russia does intervene, it may do so too late — would upset the balance of all the post-Soviet frozen conflicts, starting with the Ukrainian one. Aliyev thinks he can afford to wait until Russian troops leave Karabakh; he hasn’t promised to give up Azerbaijan’s remaining territorial claims. The Georgians, Ukrainians and Moldovans may also decide that returning territory ripped from their countries by now-frozen conflicts is merely a matter of waiting for an opportune moment — in late September, the Kremlin was distracted by the dramatic events in Belarus — and launching a well-prepared military operation. Azerbaijan’s experience shows that Russia may not act even if its personnel die: Moscow appears to have accepted Azeri apologies for accidentally shooting down a Russian helicopter over Armenia on Nov. 9.
Put bluntly, the status quo in the post-Soviet world hangs too heavily on perceptions of Russia’s military strength and its willingness to use it. The apparent outcome of the latest Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suggests those perceptions are changing, with unpredictable consequences for Putin and a complex post-imperial space.'
- Leonid Bershidsky,
Aliyev’s Military Solution in Karabakh Is a Loss for Putin, November 10, 2020
Context'..even with the offer of full autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan.'