'This reality has been opaque to most American military and civilian strategists. For over three decades, the common view of war, for them, has been that war is a rapid, decisive operation, as exemplified in the Panama Invasion (December 1989-January 1990) and the First Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991). Both operations were done quickly and decisively and with minimum casualties. These operations became America’s model of war, the standard by which all war was measured. The problem is that the model is a myth.
..
Then reality spoke: America’s post-9/11 wars did not fit the model, though we tried to apply it nonetheless. In a relatively rapid set of major combat operations the U.S. rid Afghanistan of the Taliban government and routed al Qaeda. When those operations were completed, in the minds of many, the war was over. What followed, by definition, was “not war.” Thus, U.S. strategy and attention lost focus, and the war dragged on. Ultimately, the U.S. withdrew, and the Taliban returned. The same approach governed the initial invasion of Iraq. A campaign of rapid major combat operations destroyed Saddam Hussein’s army. Again, in the minds of too many, the war was over and what followed was “not war.” America’s strategy dithered, the troop surge of 2007-2009 prevented defeat and offered American leaders a potential success, but the U.S withdrew, only having to return several years later, leaving Iraq a fragile and unfinished success — at best.
In both cases, one of the main reasons America faltered was that its model for using force to achieve its strategic political objectives (i.e., war) was deficient. America’s faltering strategic performance in Afghanistan and Iraq mattered. These U.S. failures — and a weak U.S. response to Putin’s initial illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2014 — contributed to Putin’s belief that he could get away with his second aggression against the Ukraine government and people in 2022.
Winning the Ukraine War matters even more. The outcome of this war will affect the kind of world that emerges: one in which respect for international norms holds or one where more “Ukraines” flare up in Europe and elsewhere. It’s in America’s long-term interest to encourage the former and prevent the latter.
War is a test of wills and requires learning. American will is being tested in the Ukraine War. And the coming months will tell whether U.S. strategists have learned from the mistakes of the post-9/11 wars or will repeat them. The stakes are too high to fail the test or fail to learn.'Ukraine Proves, Once Again, That Our Idea of War Is All WrongBy Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik
August 22, 2023
SourceU.S. and NATO military strategists are taught that the decisive part of a war resides in the major combat operations phase. America’s post-9/11 wars and the Ukraine War have proven that’s not so. Rather, using force during major combat operations, and after, together form the necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve the strategic political objectives of a war.
For the U.S. and other Ukraine allies this means a full commitment to supplying, on time, what the Ukrainian military needs to succeed in its counteroffensive. It also means an equal commitment to orchestrating all that is necessary to move from the end of major fighting through transitional stability to a durable political, economic and security situation in the region. Without both, neither Ukraine’s nor the allies’ strategic objectives will be realized.
The Zelenskyy administration’s aims of political sovereignty and territorial integrity allowing for self-determination and economic prosperity will not be accomplished merely by fighting to eject Russian troops from Ukrainian soil. It’s also in the allies’ strategic self-interest to continue to provide the aid and support to help Ukraine defeat Russia. The assistance that the U.S., NATO and other allies are providing helps to secure NATO’s borders, deters the war from escalating or widening, prevents an anarchical world in which illegal aggression becomes a norm, and sets conditions for holding Vladimir Putin and Russia accountable for the many heinous war crimes.
Winning in Ukraine is a form of deterrence from which both America and NATO will derive strategic benefit.
To attain Ukraine’s, America’s and NATO’s strategic political war aims, some form of international military force — that can create stability in the immediate post-major combat period, as well as establish the conditions for long-term security, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, economic and fiscal recovery — will be necessary for a good while after major fighting ends. This international stability force also will be necessary to separate forces and monitor Russia’s withdrawal, assure a proper environment exists to investigate and document the extensive and horrendous Russian war crimes, provide unimpeded movement for returning refugees and evacuees, allow for social/political reconstitution within Ukraine and the region, assist in demining, ameliorate the potential for corruption, and prevent Russia from using “deniable” forces like its special operations units, contractors and criminal gangs to foment instability.
The types of tasks described above are commonly misunderstood as “post-war” operations. But they are very much part of any war; they just occur after major fighting ends. The true measure of force’s utility, as Gen. Sir Rupert Smith reminds us in The Utility of Force, is “whether or not [the] death and destruction serve to achieve the … political purpose the force was intended to achieve.”
This reality has been opaque to most American military and civilian strategists. For over three decades, the common view of war, for them, has been that war is a rapid, decisive operation, as exemplified in the Panama Invasion (December 1989-January 1990) and the First Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991). Both operations were done quickly and decisively and with minimum casualties. These operations became America’s model of war, the standard by which all war was measured. The problem is that the model is a myth.
The technologies emerging in the mid-to-late 1990s inspired academicians, strategists and leaders — some in uniform — to promulgate the false belief that the nature of war had changed. Some advocates even thought that information would be so accurate and ubiquitous that the fog of war would be lifted, ending uncertainty and ambiguity. The model defined war too narrowly: major combat operations, fighting that was conventional, technology-enhanced, rapid, and decisive. All other uses of force were “not war,” and assigned euphemistic titles like Military Operations Other than War, Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement Operations, Counterterrorist Operations, Stability Operations, Nation Building, Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Grey Zone Operations, or Shadow War.
Then reality spoke: America’s post-9/11 wars did not fit the model, though we tried to apply it nonetheless. In a relatively rapid set of major combat operations the U.S. rid Afghanistan of the Taliban government and routed al Qaeda. When those operations were completed, in the minds of many, the war was over. What followed, by definition, was “not war.” Thus, U.S. strategy and attention lost focus, and the war dragged on. Ultimately, the U.S. withdrew, and the Taliban returned. The same approach governed the initial invasion of Iraq. A campaign of rapid major combat operations destroyed Saddam Hussein’s army. Again, in the minds of too many, the war was over and what followed was “not war.” America’s strategy dithered, the troop surge of 2007-2009 prevented defeat and offered American leaders a potential success, but the U.S withdrew, only having to return several years later, leaving Iraq a fragile and unfinished success — at best.
In both cases, one of the main reasons America faltered was that its model for using force to achieve its strategic political objectives (i.e., war) was deficient. America’s faltering strategic performance in Afghanistan and Iraq mattered. These U.S. failures — and a weak U.S. response to Putin’s initial illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2014 — contributed to Putin’s belief that he could get away with his second aggression against the Ukraine government and people in 2022.
Winning the Ukraine War matters even more. The outcome of this war will affect the kind of world that emerges: one in which respect for international norms holds or one where more “Ukraines” flare up in Europe and elsewhere. It’s in America’s long-term interest to encourage the former and prevent the latter.
War is a test of wills and requires learning. American will is being tested in the Ukraine War. And the coming months will tell whether U.S. strategists have learned from the mistakes of the post-9/11 wars or will repeat them. The stakes are too high to fail the test or fail to learn.
James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. His military command and operational roles were in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq and he has trained forces in many countries.Context(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - '..making the judgments that could help Ukraine defeat Russia, regain its territory, and win this war.'(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - ' Ukraine needs ATACMS and Germany's Taurus cruise missile..'