'..In the meantime, everything focuses on those 7-10km advances from Robotyne and other frontline areas. As always, the fighting and the dying will be done by Ukrainians, but the West absolutely must ensure that there are sufficient rocket artillery systems, ammunition, and support to do the job.'
- Jan Kallberg,
Ukraine — Victory Is Closer Than You Think, August 23, 2023
'So the major task now, with a few weapon exceptions, is ensuring steady supplies, not getting initial approvals. There is a gap we need to improvise our way through over the next 12-18 months until production scales up fully to meet Ukraine’s military requirements.
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The core issue is that unlike other imperial powers, Russia never underwent a post-imperial transition. Its identity remains anchored to 19th-century notions of great power status hinging on land acquisition, not socio-economic development.
..
So unfortunately, this war is just one chapter in Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, not its conclusion, if Russia does not transition to a post-imperial identity. That is why I argued before the NATO Madrid summit that the best way to spur this transition is admitting Ukraine to NATO, depriving Russia of the space to project imperial fantasies externally.''
[Question:] Regarding the weapons Ukraine doesn’t have: earlier, you explained how artillery was crucial for Ukraine in the first days of the war, then how crucial it was for Ukraine to receive long strike capabilities. What weapons does Ukraine currently need the most? And how would they change the situation?[Mykola Bielieskov:] With the exception of some advanced capabilities still off the table, like ATACMS missiles – I estimate less than a 50% chance those get approved anytime soon – or fighter jets where Ukrainian pilots are still training pending a final decision, I would say the major problem now is not getting approval for new systems from the US.
We have mostly overcome those barriers and secured the needed decisions in 2022. The issue now is ensuring sustained flows and stocks of munitions. And that is a challenge, especially artillery shells.
It’s not only 155mm high explosive shells. We also need more guided MLRS rockets for HIMARS, at least double current production, to meet needs. The same goes for Stinger missiles – in a year and a half of war we have used as many as the US produced in 10 years.
There are ongoing issues with air defenses too, not just fighter jets to help plug gaps between SAM systems. We need more surface-to-air missiles themselves and munitions for them. There was recent news of Lockheed Martin boosting the production of munitions for Patriot SAMs for example.
So the major task now, with a few weapon exceptions, is ensuring steady supplies, not getting initial approvals. There is a gap we need to improvise our way through over the next 12-18 months until production scales up fully to meet Ukraine’s military requirements.
Then we can look at transitioning back to defense and wearing down the Russians, since their offensives have demonstrated zero combat effectiveness and heavy losses lately. Successful defensive campaigns, combined with stockpiling resources, could create openings for future counteroffensives after proper training.
The weapons situation now is thus quite different from 2022, when securing those initial approvals was the challenge. Now it’s about sustaining sufficient volumes of supplies, which remains a serious test for Western military industries that previously pursued “peace dividends” and drawdowns.
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..As one of my professors taught, Russia sees non-military instruments like psychological operations and secret services as the most important tools, over hard power like the military. Closing these rifts will be crucial .. Even without Putin, Russia would still view us as a threat and seek to destroy us, particularly when motivated by revanchist sentiments. I see no other option than steadfast resistance. We must make our allies increase production capacity instead of reducing our ambitions.
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The core issue is that unlike other imperial powers, Russia never underwent a post-imperial transition. Its identity remains anchored to 19th-century notions of great power status hinging on land acquisition, not socio-economic development.
This is the biggest problem. Even if Ukraine regains all its territory, nobody will forcibly transform Russia internally the way denazification reshaped Germany after 1945. Without that fundamental change, nothing prevents a future revival of aggression in 10 or 30 years, if Russia is welcomed back by naive Western politicians.
So unfortunately, this war is just one chapter in Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, not its conclusion, if Russia does not transition to a post-imperial identity. That is why I
argued before the NATO Madrid summit that the best way to spur this transition is admitting Ukraine to NATO, depriving Russia of the space to project imperial fantasies externally.
With no external outlet, Russians would be forced to focus inward on domestic reform. Bringing Ukraine into NATO would demonstrate to Russians that the supposed Western expansion was stopped and even reversed by Moscow’s aggression, which backfired. It would achieve more sustainably what arms supplies aim for in the short-term, and likely at lower long-term cost.
But the problem is policymakers ignore the price of alternative actions – in this case, inaction. I predict that in 5-10 years, Western elites will agree it would have been wiser to admit Ukraine to NATO in 2022 instead of just providing weapons. It would have been cheaper in the long run.
That is our difficult task – changing the mindset of the Biden administration or any future US administration fixated on minimizing immediate risks, while forcing Ukraine to bear the brunt of this approach. It is unsustainable, despite our miracles so far. But we cannot do it alone indefinitely.
The core challenge is ensuring Russia’s post-imperial transition. Without that, this tragic chapter will repeat in the Russia-Ukraine confrontation, which Moscow initiated.'
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The one most important thing for Ukraine’s counteroffensive, August 23, 2023
ContextNo alternative. Ukraine’s full fledged NATO membership is the only efficient security guarantee, July 7, 2023
(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - '..Ukraine placed its bets on a proper attrition rate..'(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - '..Moscow can’t be trusted..'(Putin's War) - 'Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine..''[Russia] may become a threat to the world. That is the worst thing that could happen to Russia.' - Yegor Gaidar(Cult of the dead) - The problem: [the] imperial structure of Russia and .. its imperialist mindset