'..U.S. officials should make it clear that if Putin continues to attack civilians and the infrastructure they depend on, the United States will incrementally remove restrictions, including those that currently prevent Ukraine from taking proportional, discriminate action on Russian soil in response to Russian attacks on Ukrainian soil.''In Putin’s nearly quarter century of rule, time has been his most constant accomplice. Putin has used his increasing authoritarianism, especially after returning to the presidency in 2012, to buy time: time to defang his internal critics, to shape the Russian mind with propaganda, to wait out the attention span of the West in the wake of past outrages, and to lure elites in Russia and its near abroad into a web of corruption.
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In response, the United States and Ukraine’s international partners should be prepared to bolster the Ukrainian spirit and wind the clock that is tick-tocking in Putin’s head. They of course must continue to deliver military assistance, but they also need, consistent with international law, to weaken Russia and remind Putin and the Ukrainian people that the opponents of the Kremlin’s violent aggression retain agency; they can still do things.
The West can widen its approach in the coming months in several ways. Western countries should provide expertise and intelligence to Ukrainians that they can use to take out Russian installations inside Russia that are critical to the resupply of the frontlines and to Russian air attacks. Drone attacks or acts of sabotage that target military bases and equipment factories could become more common, further weakening the Russian war effort and making the war more palpable to the Russian people.
The U.S. and key partners should also send a clear message to Putin that if he attacks critical infrastructure such as gas, water, and electricity systems this winter, as he has in the past, they will not only deliver ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles but also remove some of the limitations placed on the weapons systems already provided to Ukraine—restrictions that currently prevent Ukraine from using such arms to attack targets in Russia. Despite the terrible state of the U.S.-Russian relationship, U.S. officials have stressed to their Russian counterparts how Washington has successfully limited the scope of the conflict and avoided escalation, notably by restricting the use of certain weapons now in Ukrainian hands. The United States has earned credibility with Putin by being able to exercise such control. U.S. officials should make it clear that if Putin continues to attack civilians and the infrastructure they depend on, the United States will incrementally remove restrictions, including those that currently prevent Ukraine from taking proportional, discriminate action on Russian soil in response to Russian attacks on Ukrainian soil.
Away from the battlefield, the United States and other partners should begin formally taking Russia’s international reserves, which many countries seized after Putin launched the invasion, and transfer them to a fund to support Ukraine. About $300 billion of Russian sovereign reserves have been frozen since the beginning of the war. Concerns about setting a dangerous international legal precedent—as well as the potential knock-on effects for central banks and the international financial system—have so far prevented the United States and its partners from enacting such transfers. But it is time to overcome the legal objections, with as much care as possible to narrow the precedent established, and to begin creating a Ukraine reconstruction fund with Russian assets. To start, Western officials should transfer $20 billion a month. Putin will believe that for as long as the reserves have not been formally seized, they remain on the negotiating table at the war’s end. The transfer of $20 billion a month for as long as his illegal, misguided war continues will remind him of the passage of time and become a further testament to the war’s mounting costs.
All three of these measures would bolster Ukrainians’ sense of capability and their sense that their plight is understood. To be able to exact military costs inside Russia, just as Russia has done since the start of the war in Ukraine, would provide a partial leveling of the playing field. It would remind Ukrainians that as Putin tries to break them, they have the ability to resist in new ways that hurt Putin and his military. The announcement that a real Ukraine reconstruction fund—which ultimately needs to be hundreds of billions of dollars—is beginning with Russian reserves as seed funding would indicate that Ukraine’s partners are planning for a hopeful future for the beleaguered country and its people. And crucially, such commitment to the defense of Ukraine will speed the clock that Putin now finds himself racing against.'
- Daniel Baer,
source, september 5, 2023
Context(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - The West Needs a Strategy for After the Counteroffensive(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - '..Ukraine is doing immense work for European security and suffering massively in the process..'(Ukraine needs ATACMs) - '..Providing more aid to Ukraine .. could shorten the existing conflict.''..Ukraine .. what they need now is a firepower boost with M26 cluster rockets'