'..Soviet-era concept .. in Russian policy during this war .. is known as reflexive control.'

'The amazing thing is that this campaign of reflexive control is working even though there have been countless unfulfilled Russian nuclear threats over the past two years, and many different Russian red lines that Ukraine has crossed. Ukraine has regularly attacked Crimea and many targets inside Russia—and Russia has normally downplayed the attacks after they happen..

..

Who has not been won-over by the Russian reflexive control policy—those states who would actually suffer if Russia launched a nuclear attack. Its those on the border with Russia and Belarus that understand that to even engage in these debates is to surrender your intellectual framework to Putin. For instance this week, the Finns (who have been tremendous since Feb 24, 2022) made it very well known that they would have no qualms if the Ukrainians used the weapons Finland has provided to them, to attack into Russia. To make it clear, the assurances were ascribed to the Finnish Defense Secretary.'

'There is an fascinating Soviet-era concept that has figured enormously in Russian policy during this war and it is known as reflexive control. To have reflexive control means to assert influence over an enemy/opponent by affecting their way of thinking—to so shape their way they view a question that they do what you want them to do. In other words, you get inside your enemies thought processes so that they make their decisions within a framework that you have created. Reflexive control is based on the assumption that controlling the way your enemy thinks can mean as much if not more than what happens on the battlefield.

In this war the most successful (in a tragic way) example of reflexive control that has been exercised by the Russian government has been their ability to limit the aid given to Ukraine by the USA and Germany by planting in American and German minds a profound worry about escalation. In particular, by making the US and German governments believe that Putin could use nuclear weapons if Ukraine attacked Crimea or targets inside Russia itself, the Russians through reflexive control have seriously limited the range of the weaponry given to Ukraine.

This week saw maybe one of the greatest examples of the Russian reflexive control campaign in action. When French President Emmanuel Macron openly discussed the possibility of European troops being deployed into Ukraine, Putin responded with some of his most ghoulish threats yet. If anything like this happened, the Russian dictator exclaimed, it could result in the destruction of the human race. While deliberately referencing Macron’s comments, Putin offered up the possibility of a world-wide nuclear war.

Mr. Putin said NATO countries that were helping Ukraine strike Russian territory or might consider sending their own troops “must, in the end, understand” that “all this truly threatens a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore the destruction of civilization.”

“We also have weapons that can strike targets on their territory,” Mr. Putin said. “Do they not understand this?”

At the same time last week the Financial Times published a story based on leaks about Russian nuclear policy, which used Russian sources to claim that the Russians had a far lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons than had previously been understood.

The amazing thing is that this campaign of reflexive control is working even though there have been countless unfulfilled Russian nuclear threats over the past two years, and many different Russian red lines that Ukraine has crossed. Ukraine has regularly attacked Crimea and many targets inside Russia—and Russia has normally downplayed the attacks after they happen. Indeed, here is a timeline of all the different periods of Russian nuclear-threat making. I dont know the exact figure but my guess is that if you add Putin and Lavrov together, you’ve probably had well over 100 threats to use nuclear weapons.

You would think this Boy-Who-Cried-Nuclear-Wolf policy might at this point be understood as the bluff that it is. However, even though there is a regular admission that the chance of Russia using nuclear weapons is “unlikely” the fact that we are even having this discussion today is a sign of how successful Russia’s reflexive control policy has been. The Russians have set up the intellectual universe where the mind-set in places like Washington and Berlin is not to dismiss these nuclear threats for the desperate signs of failure that they are, but to wonder what exactly the chance is that they might be right. Just having the debate, shows the Russians have won.

Who has not been won-over by the Russian reflexive control policy—those states who would actually suffer if Russia launched a nuclear attack. Its those on the border with Russia and Belarus that understand that to even engage in these debates is to surrender your intellectual framework to Putin. For instance this week, the Finns (who have been tremendous since Feb 24, 2022) made it very well known that they would have no qualms if the Ukrainians used the weapons Finland has provided to them, to attack into Russia. To make it clear, the assurances were ascribed to the Finnish Defense Secretary..

That is how you break out of reflexive control—by refusing to play inside the world the Russians have created, and seek out your own position. Sadly, and I can say having just been in Washington, the debate there is still taking part within the intellectual world Putin has created. So far, when it comes to this part of the war, he has won.'

- Prof. Phillips P. O’Brien, Weekend #70: Reflexive Control and Putin's Nuclear Threats, March 3, 2024



Context

(Trump being a Putin-slave) - [Trump's] obedience to Russia

Kaja Kallas explains Russian negotiations tactics, 2023