'To some hawks in the West, President Biden’s willingness even to talk to his Russian counterpart was a concession. This is a deeply dangerous contention, as dialogue and diplomacy are precisely at their most valuable with those with whom one disagrees and in times of the greatest tension.
A more reasonable criticism is that nothing new came of the conversation. The various sanctions Biden presumably outlined are unlikely to be different from the options already openly discussed, from extending controls on Russian banks’ access to credit markets to finally blocking Nord Stream 2.
Likewise, Putin does not seem to have offered any new concessions or potential diplomatic solutions. The Kremlin and its usual mouthpieces have been floating the need for some more comprehensive security deal for some time now, and Russian forces are still building up around Ukraine’s borders.
It’s good to talkHowever, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan affirmed after the event that “there is no substitute for direct dialogue between leaders, and that is true in spades when it comes to the U.S.-Russia relationship” and he is right. It would be a mistake to consider the conversation futile and fruitless.
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Putin clearly has some strange and unhealthy notions about Ukraine and the Ukrainian people that preclude them true agency and sovereignty. He is also by no means alone in believing that the West duped Moscow over NATO expansion, hence his likely unachievable desire for cast iron guarantees about what would, in effect, be the enforced ‘Finlandisation’ of Ukraine.
At the same time, the nature of haggling is that both parties start with extreme bids, expecting to be negotiated towards the middle. It may well be that the gap is unbridgeable, and in any case this is not simply a deal to be struck between Moscow and Washington — it is not for either of them to dispose of Ukraine’s fate.
However, insofar as any diplomatic solution may be achievable, that can only come when both sides talk.'
- Mark Galeotti,
What Good Could the Putin/Biden Conversation Really Do? December 8, 2021
'..the West should not relinquish its principled refusal to accept Russian annexation of Crimea..''Finally, Western states should use this moment to offer a broader dialogue about steps that could help assuage some of Russia’s security concerns. Such a dialogue might explore steps such as a reinvigoration of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Among other things, the two sides could discuss how to reaffirm and build on the alliance’s commitment under that Act to avoid the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new member states. Reciprocal commitments from Moscow with respect to restraint in the use of force would of course be required. Both sides would also benefit from a discussion about limits and transparency commitments with respect to conventional force deployments in flashpoint areas. Toning down rhetoric about NATO expansion could allay some of Moscow’s fears without necessarily revising the alliance’s open-door policy or accepting the notion of a Russian sphere of influence.
Ideally, Russia would see on its own that further aggression in Ukraine will not yield the results it wants and would entail costs that reinforce some of the regional dynamics it most fears. But Western leaders cannot count on this happening. They should ensure a unified approach on deterrence, communicate it to Moscow and choreograph a way back from an increasingly menacing standoff.
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..the West should not relinquish its principled refusal to accept Russian annexation of Crimea, it could curb naval exercises that challenge Russia’s claims there .. Moreover, Western powers should – as Crisis Group has argued before – prepare to trade sanctions relief for de-escalatory measures by Russia and its proxies. They might offer measure-for-measure relief once the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gets full access to the Ukraine-Russia border and other non-government-controlled areas; upon disengagement of forces along the Donbas front lines; after local elections in Donbas have been scheduled; or following the disarming of separatist forces. The gradual lifting of sanctions in return might begin with those on borrowing conditions for Russian banks and companies and on individuals not involved in Crimea’s annexation and end with the total removal of sectoral and personal sanctions after Ukraine regains control of its border.
The risks to using sanctions relief as an incentive along these lines are real but still worth taking. Critics of putting sanctions on the table before the Ukraine talks have progressed much further tend to highlight the danger that Russia will backslide and the West will struggle to rebuild the consensus that got sanctions imposed in the first place. But that risk has to be weighed against the perils of the moment. There seems to be increasing recognition in European capitals and Washington that the sanctions policy needs an overhaul. Russia itself appears ready to have such a conversation if the U.S. takes the lead. As a Russian expert on sanctions told Crisis Group, “Russia will not discuss sanctions in the abstract because that would be tantamount to recognising itself as a party to the conflict in Ukraine, but if the U.S. presents a specific plan to lift sanctions, Russia will of course consider it carefully”.
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The risks to using sanctions relief as an incentive along these lines are real but still worth taking. Critics of putting sanctions on the table before the Ukraine talks have progressed much further tend to highlight the danger that Russia will backslide and the West will struggle to rebuild the consensus that got sanctions imposed in the first place. But that risk has to be weighed against the perils of the moment. There seems to be increasing recognition in European capitals and Washington that the sanctions policy needs an overhaul. Russia itself appears ready to have such a conversation if the U.S. takes the lead. As a Russian expert on sanctions told Crisis Group, “Russia will not discuss sanctions in the abstract because that would be tantamount to recognising itself as a party to the conflict in Ukraine, but if the U.S. presents a specific plan to lift sanctions, Russia will of course consider it carefully”.
Fourthly, at the reformatted peace talks, the parties would need to take a somewhat different approach to Minsk. For all their flaws, the 2014 and 2015 agreements are, at least formally, something all parties have agreed to, and they were endorsed by the UN Security Council. They are also at the core of Western governments’ stated policies regarding Ukraine and Russia.
Rather than creating additional uncertainty about whether Ukraine ever intends to fulfil the agreements, Washington, Kyiv and their European partners should show a new seriousness about implementing them – including the difficult steps of affording some autonomy for separatist-controlled Donbas, holding local elections there and granting a broad amnesty for separatists who lay down their arms. In so doing, the parties could explore creative options for addressing Ukraine’s concerns about holding elections before it assumes control over its border. Possible solutions include involving a third party – likely the OSCE or the UN – to monitor the border and the region as a whole while elections are held.
Fifthly, the European Union could begin discussing a special format for negotiations with Russia to address the Kremlin’s concerns regarding EU relations with third countries. This format can be based on the declaration by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany in 2015, at the time of the second Minsk agreements, which affirmed the leaders’ “support [for] trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia in order to achieve practical solutions to concerns raised by Russia with regards to the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU”. Thus far, the parties have used this format only to discuss Russian gas transit through Ukraine.
Finally, because immediate de-escalatory steps will be insufficient to assuage Russia’s long-term concerns about European security – and even the approach to Ukraine peace talks and Minsk will fall far short of what Russian wants – it will be necessary to begin laying the groundwork for additional steps that will put relations between Russia and its Western neighbours on a steadier footing. The measures cited above are a starting point, but they will need to be solidified and in certain cases expanded, some quietly and some more formally. For example, NATO members are unlikely to walk away from their open-door policy, and the declaration from their 2008 Bucharest summit, which promised eventual Ukrainian and Georgian membership, but they can reach an understanding with Moscow that they will tone down their rhetoric. A quieter approach would not imply the alliance’s willingness to cede a sphere of influence to the Kremlin..
As regards more concrete commitments, Moscow and Brussels should look to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, by which NATO affirmed to Russia that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states” and no plan to “permanently station substantial combat forces” there. Today’s threat of escalation risks upending what is left of the second promise. The two sides could agree to deepen these commitments (for instance, by defining “substantial”). The alliance could also commit not to station permanent combat forces in non-NATO members of the OSCE, including Ukraine. They could discuss limiting temporary visits of NATO member state and Russian troops and instructors to these countries. Such steps would be explicitly contingent on reciprocal commitments by Moscow not to use force or support its use against OSCE states – and also to refrain from stationing forces on the territory of non-allies. Because such a mutual commitment implies resolution of the Ukraine war, it would be possible only after Russian-backed forces in Ukraine disarm and Kyiv regains sovereignty over breakaway areas.
In addition, Russia, Ukraine and Western states would be well-served by beginning negotiations to define express limits and transparency commitments regarding conventional force deployments, exercises and other activities in potential flashpoint areas, especially in and around the Black and Baltic Seas. These discussions will surely take time, but they are crucial to prevent future crises and manage what will likely be a conflictual relationship for some time to come, given the disparity between Moscow’s security goals and those of Western states.
VII. ConclusionThe worry is that, before they get to have these conversations, the parties could take the region in a much darker and more dangerous direction. Russia, the potential aggressor, should turn back while there is still time, if nothing else to avoid the costs that it will incur to itself and create for others, all in the service of goals that military force cannot attain. But as Moscow shows no sign of doing so at present, it behooves the U.S. and NATO allies to make clear the costs – both those they are determined to impose and those that may be hard to stop – by defining them and communicating them clearly to Moscow.
At the same time, it would be a mistake for Washington to rely on sticks alone. The U.S. and its allies need to be prepared to show movement of their own if they want to achieve the choreographed de-escalation that would serve both sides’ interests. As an immediate matter, they could pursue a quiet mutual deal to throttle back provocative military exercises and to allow diplomatic missions to be re-staffed. Such a deal should also be joined to new commitments that the U.S. will play an enhanced role in peace talks if Russia returns to the table; that Kyiv and the West will take a new approach to Minsk implementation; and that measure-for-measure sanctions relief will be up for discussion.
Concrete steps to shore up the broader European security order need to run parallel to peacemaking in Ukraine. The present crisis points to how shaky that order has become, as well as to the harrowing repercussions of further deterioration. Even as the U.S. and its partners prepare to show the Kremlin the depth of their resolve, they should also be laying the groundwork for a new approach that can help ward off future crises and bring greater stability to the region.'
- Crisis Group,
Responding to Russia’s New Military Buildup Near Ukraine, 8 December 2021
Context'..We have a revanchist Russia .. And we have a China, which is still Leninist..''..effective counter-intelligence services, proper oversight over the flow of funds and serious policing of corruption at home, media awareness for a new generation of citizens .. to increase the effectiveness .. of existing political structures.'(Russia) - '..the wounds inflicted by the Soviet experiment have never healed..''This paper explains why Russia and China’s economic cooperation plans have failed since 2014..'