'It would be impossible to overstate the advantages of not doing something, of not playing any role, of standing aside and allowing a situation to evolve or devolve without any involvement on your part. Like in the movie “War Games,” you win by doing nothing.
This is a lesson that American foreign policymakers need to internalize more than any other .. Contrary to Likud propaganda, cutting off military assistance would not create an imminent existential threat. Between the $85 billion of U.S. aid to Israel since 1949, its robust economy and closer ties to many of its Arab neighbors, there is little danger that this tiny, ferocious country would get pushed into the sea. And if that were to change, we could reevaluate the situation and resume funding—assuming Israel decided to try to make peace and were to cooperate with the establishment of a free and independent Palestine .. Whatever Israel decides to do on its own, however, it will do without our blessing and without our funding.'
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End Military Aid to Israel, May 16, 2021
'Gulf countries have every incentive to ensnare the U.S. in regional entanglements to bolster their own position. U.S. security interests are narrow, limited to preventing nuclear proliferation and counterterrorism. The former is best resolved diplomatically and the latter doesn’t require the stationing of U.S. missile defenses, carrier groups, or permanent garrisons abroad .. The report also conflates reducing the U.S. military presence with ceding the region to China, though it admits China’s primary interest is a mercantile one. Why then does the U.S. require a military presence to stay economically relevant in the region? If China were to adopt a military role in the region, it would incur the same costs which the U.S. currently bears. A U.S. that is militarily disengaged is not in any worse position than a military disengaged China.
The opponents of withdrawing from the Middle East have recycled the same arguments. They misinterpret the much-needed reevaluation of our military role with a retreat to Fortress America. The troop drawdowns in recent weeks are a step in the right direction. Conventional wisdom will continue to produce the same conventional results which were seen in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq. It’s time to give the unconventional a chance.''Partner countries may want the U.S. to retain a military presence. But this doesn’t mean it’s in the U.S.’s interest to do so. Whether it be the UAE or Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries have every incentive to ensnare the U.S. in regional entanglements to bolster their own position. U.S. security interests are narrow, limited to preventing nuclear proliferation and counterterrorism. The former is best resolved diplomatically and the latter doesn’t require the stationing of U.S. missile defenses, carrier groups, or permanent garrisons abroad.
The report unintentionally provides a sensible forecast of how regional security would shift after a U.S. departure, warning that partner countries will simply, “(S)eek out alternative arrangements to meet their security needs.” That’s actually a good thing. The U.S., by acting as security guarantor, has inadvertently discouraged regional diplomacy. Rifts between Iran and Saudi Arabia grew due to U.S. backing the latter, which imperiled both civilians in the region and oil markets in the ensuing proxy war.
When U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia shifted towards neutrality under President Biden, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman responded by making diplomatic overtures to Iran. Likewise, the Trump administration’s success with the Abraham Accords was not enabled by the U.S. military presence, but by affinities between states balancing against Iran. These “alternative arrangements” are poised to deliver more regional stability than years of U.S. intervention.
As the report states, East Asia does not enjoy oil self-sufficiency, which makes U.S. allies vulnerable to disruptions. But this same vulnerability applies to China as well. An oil crisis in the Middle East hurts an oil-importing adversary as much as it does our friends. Furthermore, China has enjoyed years of stable maritime flows from the Middle East at U.S. expense. China stands to lose far more from a Middle East oil crisis than the U.S.
The report also conflates reducing the U.S. military presence with ceding the region to China, though it admits China’s primary interest is a mercantile one. Why then does the U.S. require a military presence to stay economically relevant in the region? If China were to adopt a military role in the region, it would incur the same costs which the U.S. currently bears. A U.S. that is militarily disengaged is not in any worse position than a military disengaged China.
The opponents of withdrawing from the Middle East have recycled the same arguments. They misinterpret the much-needed reevaluation of our military role with a retreat to Fortress America. The troop drawdowns in recent weeks are a step in the right direction. Conventional wisdom will continue to produce the same conventional results which were seen in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq. It’s time to give the unconventional a chance.'
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US withdrawal from the Middle East doesn't spell doomsday, June 30, 2021
'..the United States has no compelling military need to keep a permanent troop presence in the Middle East.''Given the extreme difficulties faced either by a would-be regional hegemon or an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, the United States has no compelling military need to keep a permanent troop presence in the Middle East. It should be the medium- to long-term objective of the United States to align its military presence with its strategic interests in the Middle East, beginning a responsible and timely drawdown of U.S. forces in the region now.'
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Nothing Much to Do: Why America Can Bring All Troops Home From the Middle East, June 24, 2021
'..withdrawal should not be made contingent on a stability that the Mideast rarely has had, especially since allied states then would have an incentive to foment conflict to get Washington to stay. While maintaining the offshore capacity to act militarily, if truly necessary, the U.S. should encourage regional parties to develop their own security system, which would require confronting their many grievances against one another.''If the U.S. really wants peace in the Middle East, it should stop getting entangled in bitter but ultimately meaningless Mideast conflicts. The problem goes back decades. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan made his greatest mistake and sent U.S. troops into the Lebanese civil war, hosting a score of warring factions. There was little the Marines could achieve before being driven out by the embassy and barracks bombings. During the 1980s, Washington backed Iraq’s Sunni dictator against Iran, providing intelligence, aiding development of chemical weapons, and protecting Kuwaiti oil traffic that helped fund Baghdad’s war.
The Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations all later warred against Iraq, empowering Iran..
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America’s experience backs Gholz’s argument that current U.S. strategy is harmful. As he explained: “Decades of U.S. military presence in the region have contributed to an artificial power imbalance. States that align with the United States feel they can rely on the guarantee of U.S. military might, while those deemed hostile must fear the possibility of invasion and regime change. The U.S. role influences the behavior of both: U.S. partners act with aggressive impunity, while U.S. adversaries seek avenues of resistance, including arming non‐state militias and proxy forces. Rather than contributing to stability, the large presence of the U.S. military undermines U.S. interests by contributing to instability, which in turn can enmesh the United States in additional conflicts.”
Obviously, withdrawal should be responsible, which means allowing countries dependent on the U.S. to adapt. Gholz suggests informing countries which host U.S. troops so they can begin preparing. However, withdrawal should not be made contingent on a stability that the Mideast rarely has had, especially since allied states then would have an incentive to foment conflict to get Washington to stay. While maintaining the offshore capacity to act militarily, if truly necessary, the U.S. should encourage regional parties to develop their own security system, which would require confronting their many grievances against one another.
That wouldn’t be easy, of course. However, the Iran‐Saudi contacts and Gulf State overtures to Syria are evidence of what might be if Washington gets out of the way. Greater stability and peace without U.S. military garrisons. “Presence is not deterrence, nor is deterrence the only way to protect U.S. interests,” argued Gholz. If Biden can end America’s 20‐year‐participation in an unnecessary war, why not also end America’s 40‐year occupation of a region of ever decreasing importance?'
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A Blueprint for Getting Out of the Middle East, July 8, 2021
ContextMiddle East prepares for the US to exit Syria(To learn to train for peace - Train for Peace)(The Child) - '..to discuss a unified approach to supporting peace in Afghanistan.''..not through endless military deployments..' - Biden(The U.S. out of the Middle East) - '..Syria .. exit plan .. the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces .. the least apart in terms of their differing visions for the country..''For starters, Americans are sick of this war and mainstream media warmongering.''..We spent four or five trillion dollars on the war on terrorism and two invasions of two countries.'