'..This way leads us towards a quasi-Soviet economy detached from the world and, at the same time, proud of its autarchy; towards a deteriorating economy which compensates for the drop in living standards with pervasive propaganda..'<blockquote>'Citizens and businesses will try to economize – choosing cheaper and lower-quality goods than those they acquired pre-crisis. This means that said companies will not produce truly competitive goods that will be the most successful, but rather those which bring about maximum savings at the expense of quality. The latter will generate – and already in the relatively near future – a wave of economic autarchy and primitivization: as in the first case, against the backdrop of confrontation with the West, this will be justified by the necessity for self-reliance. However, the real consequence will be Russia’s retreat from the global market and its economy’s transformation into one which is much more closed (I do not foresee anything close to the USSR with its distribution of currency to purchase low-quality FMCG, but the quality of consumption will fall far beyond its volume).
..
..Accordingly, even growth in ‘substitution’ due to the expansion of the domestic market is also unlikely – it has already contracted more than in 1998.
..
The growing share of the state in the economy, the primitivization of the industrial sector, falling imports, sliding consumption – all of this, supplemented by the rhetoric of the confrontation with the West (which, as it will most certainly ‘turn out’ , ‘intentionally’ provoked the sharp drop in oil prices ‘to destabilize’ Russia) points to the only possible way forward for Russia given cheap oil. This way leads us towards a quasi-Soviet economy detached from the world and, at the same time, proud of its autarchy; towards a deteriorating economy which compensates for the drop in living standards with pervasive propaganda. Can Russia ‘opt out’ of contemporary globalization? I do not see any reasons which would prevent this. How long will it remain stable under the new conditions? I believe much longer than the majority of today’s analysts are prepared to admit…'
- Vladislav Inozemtsev,
Life after oil, August 24, 2015</blockquote>
'..the West will indeed recognize the USSR ingrained in today’s Russia .. will reassess the threats, will weigh up the risks, and might decide to go all in.'<blockquote>'There are two main conclusions which can be drawn from all of this:
First of all, attempts to reach a compromise are destined to fail since a compromise with he who considers the very idea of a compromise a personal failure is doomed from the outset.
Secondly, it may happen that the Kremlin will sooner or later succeed in its fervent attempt to assume the guise of the Soviet Union: the West will indeed recognize the USSR ingrained in today’s Russia; the West will understand that Moscow is trying to feel out its new borders and that this intuitive search may go on
ad infinitum. Hence, at this very moment the West will also see the Soviet Union as a reflection of Russia in the mirror, will reassess the threats, will weigh up the risks, and might decide to go all in.
And Russia’s main problem is that in terms of its level of resilience, it bears no resemblance to the Soviet Union.'
- Pavel Kazarin,
Russia and the West: Lost in translation,September 30, 2015</blockquote>
'While the current leadership is not responsible for the PTSD being experienced en masse, it has sadly decided to exploit this weakness rather than reconcile Russia to its present condition so that a better future can be built.'<blockquote>'The inability to assimilate the fall of the Soviet Union has led many Russians to project feelings of hatred onto the West, and more specifically America. The Kremlin has successfully channeled that hate to its own ends.
Ironically, in a country obsessed with power, it is actually everyday interactions with the state which fuel feelings of powerlessness and emasculation.
With chronic mismanagement decimating Russia’s economy, educational system and capacity for scientific innovation, militarism is the only means through which Russia can express itself perceived greatness. In the words of Russian expert Lilia Shevtsova, “The more Russia slides into crisis, the more the Russian elite will need to discuss Russia’s “humiliation” with the world.”
The burden of cognitive dissonance, between projecting superiority amidst a seething inferiority complex, is psychologically deleterious. The problem is, the state would rather seize on these psychological issues for leverage rather than heal them. The reasons are obvious. To either empower citizens through the promotion of democratic inclusiveness would weaken the elites grip on power. Instead, the citizens have been stripped of the power to shape their own society, and thus rely on the state to provide them a sense of self-worth. Rather than making Russia great, the propaganda apparatus rather makes people feel great. Only they are not free to take part in their own greatness in any tangible sense. This process has created something akin to nationwide Stockholm Syndrome.
..
..If a society does not take ownership of its tragedies, it will forever be possessed by them. And Russia in many ways is possessed.
..
While the current leadership is not responsible for the PTSD being experienced en masse, it has sadly decided to exploit this weakness rather than reconcile Russia to its present condition so that a better future can be built. Moscow could have chosen truth and reconciliation. Instead, it has chosen anger. Ukraine was not the first nation to pay the price for Russia’s unresolved trauma. Sadly, it will unlikely be the last.'
- William Echols,
The psychology behind Russia’s propaganda onslaught, September 28, 2015</blockquote>
'..accommodating Russian and Iranian demands for Assad's survival…will only prolong and intensify the conflict and will almost certainly spark a jihadist mobilization the like of which the world has never seen..'<blockquote>'The atrocities committed by the Assad regime against Syria’s largely Sunni civilian population inevitably build support for extremist groups like ISIS. The Russian airstrikes have already produced strong anti-Russian sentiment in Arab cyberspace, with hashtags such as “Russian aggression” or “Russian occupation of Syria” trending on Twitter and photos of dead children superimposed against images of Putin.
As a post from the Brookings Institution
notes, “accommodating Russian and Iranian demands for Assad's survival…will only prolong and intensify the conflict and will almost certainly spark a jihadist mobilization the like of which the world has never seen.” As the Syrian government's primary great power supporter, Russia will inevitably face angry Sunni Jihadists itching to avenge Moscow’s support for Assad.
..
..As the United States discovered in both Iraq and Afghanistan however, it’s a lot easier to get into a country than out, and at this point Russia’s exit strategy for Syria is not clear.
..
..Russia’s economy is already in a deep recession, raising the question of how long Putin can even sustain a military commitment in Syria? With oil prices showing no signs of recovering and Western sanctions still holding, Putin cannot afford to blow through Russia’s already shrinking stockpile of foreign reserves. At some point – probably sooner rather than later – the Kremlin will face some tough fiscal choices: Continue Russia’s huge military build-up and forward-leaning military posture would mean cutting other domestic expenditures such as pensions or other social insurance programs. If his constituency observes him cutting pensions in favor of a military adventure in Syria Putin’s political support could hemorrhage.
While his bold Syrian deployment may appear off to a good start, Putin may yet come to rue the gamble.'
- Josh Cohen
Putin's Syrian adventure: Masterstroke or Poisoned Chalice, October 5, 2015</blockquote>
Context<blockquote>
(Russia) 'GDP .. now $1.2 trillion .. back to the level of 1998 when it was $700bn.'</blockquote>